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Forensics Europe Expo – Recap

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Forensics Europe ExpoThis article is a recap of some of the main highlights from the Forensics Europe Expo which took place at Kensington Olympia Conference Centre, London, on the 19th-20th of April 2016.

Conference Highlights 

The Forensics Europe Expo covers all aspects of forensics, including bioforensics and other areas unrelated to digital forensics, and is held in conjunction with the Counter Terror Expo, which takes place in the same space.

This year’s expo had a much higher dedication to digital forensics than in previous years, with day two of the conference proper being dedicated to computer forensics and cybercrime. Throughout both days, there were also seminars from various digital forensics companies taking place in the smaller seminar area separate from the main auditorium.

The first day of the conference discussed certain methods and ideas for models of forensic sciences, including the Scottish way of working in which the Police Authority provide all forensic services for the country, rather than these being split between various private companies and corporate bodies. A couple of interesting case studies highlighting the challenges and advantages of collaboration were presented, including Angela Davies and Dionne Wightman discussing multidisciplinary working in mass disaster situations, and Steve Horgan of the NCA talking the audience through a large-scale international drug trafficking investigation centred on the Gambia.

Day two was when the digital forensics part of the conference properly began. It started with a talk by John Bertrand from SAP, who highlighted that online banking fraud has increased by 71% since 2011, and went on to discuss potential ways to prevent payment fraud in real time.

Professor John Walker from HEXFORENSICS then took to the stage, speaking about the increasing prevalence of both digital-only crimes such as cyberbullying, and of more “traditional” crimes having a digital element. Concerns about the rapidly developing pace of technology, along with a lack of standardisation and inadequate training, were discussed, as well as a general lack of understanding from boards of corporate directors when it comes to the importance of computer security.

Walker’s concerns were consistently addressed by other speakers throughout the day, with the vast majority expressing a similar level of concern about the sheer amount of digital forensic data generated by each crime.

There was an overarching feeling that the situation is only getting worse, as well; as the number of internet-connected devices increases, so too does the opportunity for digitally-aided crimes.

The majority of the afternoon sessions focused on CCTV, from police super-recognisers being used to search for targets in CCTV footage of crowds, to contamination of CCTV evidence and a review of common approaches to forensic facial image recognition software.

Terrorism was also a hot topic of discussion – unsurprisingly, considering that the Counter Terror Expo was happening simultaneously just next door. From the mass disasters talk on day one right the way through to the conclusion of the conference, counter terror kept coming up as an area of great urgency.

During the afternoon of the second day, DCI Dominic Murphy, the Head of Digital Investigations at London’s Metropolitan Police, spoke about the importance of digital forensics particularly in helping to foil terrorist plots and providing sufficient evidence to bring perpetrators to justice.

Prevention came up again and again throughout both days, with a pithy quote from John Bertrand on the second day:

The main takeaway of the talks at the Forensics Europe Expo, therefore, seemed to be that a greater emphasis needs to be put on security and the prevention of crimes taking place, rather than on seeking out those who have already committed crimes. This is, of course, easier said than done and there were few suggestions on how this could realistically take place. The feeling generally was one of trying to catch up: that law enforcement and forensic investigators – of all kinds, not just digital – are constantly lagging behind the criminals, trying to uncover the details of what has already happened rather than being ‘ahead of the game’, as it were.

Of course, this is partly just the nature of forensic science: looking for evidence that will stand up in a court of law. But the Forensics Europe Expo really highlighted the need for both ends of the cybercrime process – security and investigation – to work together more closely in order to prevent as many crimes from taking place as possible and create a safer world online.

The next Forensics Europe Expo will be held at Kensington Olympia Conference Centre, London, UK on the 3rd-4th of May 2017. Anyone interested in attending should consult the official website for details.



SSD and eMMC Forensics 2016 – Part 3

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What Has Changed in 2016 in the Way SSD Drives Self-Destruct Evidence: Demystifying eMMC, M.2, NVMe, and PCI-E.

by Yuri Gubanov & Oleg Afonin
© Belkasoft Research 2016

In the previous part of the article, we talked about eMMC storages and external SSDs. We also mentioned TRIM when talking about trimming behavior of eMMC. We will talk a bit more about TRIM this time and then move on to some real-life cases.

More about TRIM: Checking TRIM Support

There are several levels of TRIM support, all of which are worth checking.

  • TRIM support by the SSD drive itself.
  • Whether TRIM is enabled and active on a given system/configuration.
  • Whether TRIM is correctly implemented by the SSD controller.
  • Whether the SSD supports and implements DRAT and DZAT.

Checking whether a particular SSD drive advertises TRIM support is as easy as reviewing its S.M.A.R.T. output, using the manufacturer’s bundled tool (e.g. SSD Toolbox, Samsung Magician and similar) or using a third-party tool such as CrystalDiskInfo.

NOTE: this test simply returns information about the theoretical capability of the SSD drive to support TRIM. It does not mean that TRIM is actually enabled on a given system, and does not certify that TRIM is correctly implemented by the SSD controller.

Checking whether TRIM is enabled in a particular system involves the use of a command-line tool (must run under administrative account). Type “fsutil behavior query DisableDeleteNotify” in the command line. If the result of “1” is returned, TRIM is disabled; if you see “0”, TRIM is enabled. As you can see from the next screenshot, on our system TRIM is enabled (“0” is returned).

NOTE: this test does not alter the content of the SSD drive being checked. However, it only displays whether TRIM is active on a given system. If you perform this test on your computer, it will not give the correct indication on whether or not TRIM was enabled on the suspect’s system.

What is particularly interesting, however, is whether TRIM is fully working in the given SSD drive or not. Normally, once information is deleted, a low-level read command will return a string of zeroes as specified by Definite Read After Trim (DRAT) or Definite Zeroes After Trim (DZAT). This is normal behavior in most 2 to 4 year old SSD models. However, many current entry-level SSD drives consider DRAT/DZAT support a luxury, while some SSD controllers partially forego TRIM due to the use of built-in compression (Sandforce controllers, Intel 535 series).

Checking factual TRIM support takes writing a block of data, deleting it, and reading that block again. If you can see the data that was originally written to a data block, TRIM support is at least partially ineffective (meaning that the data may or may not be erased in the future).

We discovered an open-source SSD TRIM check tool: https://github.com/CyberShadow/trimcheck

Written by Vladimir Panteleev, the tool provides an easy way to test whether TRIM works as expected on a given SSD. Run the tool from the SSD drive you are about to check (administrative privileges required).

The first time you run the tool, it creates a file with pre-defined data. The tool notes physical sectors occupied by that file, then deletes the file.

You are supposed to wait for around 20 seconds, and then launch the tool again.

As we can see, TRIM is properly working on this SSD drive (Crucial M550, an old model superseded by MX100, MX200, then BX100 and finally BX200). The same test performed on a test system equipped with an Intel 535 series SSD returned a different result displaying TRIM as not working.

IMPORTANT: SSD Trim Check alters the content of the SSD drive being tested. This is NOT a forensic tool, and it is NOT to be used during the investigation. Trim Check does not function through a write-blocking device.

Use Cases

Since publishing the original article on SSD forensics, we have received numerous emails with questions, additions and corrections. Some of those messages described interesting use cases that are quite common in the world of digital forensics. In this section, we are about to discuss some of the most popular cases we have become aware of.

Very Slow SSD

Back in 2013, Yuri bought a high-end laptop. Slick, thin and light, his brand new laptop appeared blazingly fast. A year later, the laptop became significantly slower. It started lagging and stuttering, and took much longer than usual to open a Web browser or save a document. Yuri tried factory resetting his laptop, yet it did not do much to speed it up.

As it turned out, Yuri’s ultra-thin laptop was equipped with a PCI-E SSD. Even though his new portable computer arrived with factory installed Windows 8, Yuri did not like the new Start menu and installed Windows 7 instead. As we now know, Windows 7 does not support trim on PCI-E SSDs, so his fairly small disk was quickly filled up with remnants of uncleaned data. The SSD drive became slow to the point of being almost unusable.

Did Yuri update his laptop to Windows 10, free of charge? This would have solved most issues since Windows 10 supports trim in PCI-E SSDs and comes with a built-in disk optimization tool that would restore his disk to full performance in a matter of minutes. Instead, Yuri used this as an excuse to buy a newer and better laptop, using the old one for presentations about SSD forensics as a demonstration of the fact that trim is not always available.

Lesson to be learned: some systems are better to be used with the OS they shipped with. Downgrading the OS may introduce unexpected issues.

P.S. The name Yuri is the same as of one of the article’s authors, which is purely coincidental. Though it was him.

Upgrading a Mac

John was a happy Mac OS user. Some years ago, he replaced his hard drive with an SSD. He was well aware that Apple did not support trim on non-Apple SSD drives, yet the speed boost compared to the original hard drive was still significant.

In June 2015, John received an OS update. His system was brought to version 10.10.4 Yosemite. One of the features of the new OS was the ability to enable trim on user-supplied drives.

However, John did not notice any changes in storage performance. He had to open the terminal and use the new “trimforce” tool and reboot to enable trim. He had no issues and received a significant performance boost at no extra charge.

Lesson to be learned: OS updates may change trim behavior. Changes may not be effective automatically, and user actions may be needed to enable trim.

Unexpected Encryption

Sarah enjoyed using her Windows 8 ultrabook until its battery died. Replacing the built-in battery would cost nearly as much as a brand new device (with better specs), so she decided to pull her hard drive and transfer her data to her desktop.

Since the laptop used a small M.2 SSD, she had to buy an M.2 USB adapter to connect the SSD drive to her desktop.

M.2 to USB adapter

When she connected the SSD to her desktop and tried to open the disk, she saw a Windows prompt informing her that the disk was encrypted. Sarah was puzzled as she had never encrypted her disk before.

As it turned out, her ultrabook was equipped with a TPM module and soldered RAM. When Sarah logged in, she was offered to upgrade her Windows account to Microsoft Account, which she did. What she did not know, however, was that Windows 8 automatically encrypted her data with BitLocker Device Protection. The decryption key was stored in the TPM module and was not accessible, as the laptop would not power on.

Sarah had to mount the encrypted volume using her BitLocker Recovery Key that Windows backed up to her Windows Account (https://onedrive.live.com/recoverykey). She also learned that her brand-new replacement laptop was also encrypted with BitLocker Device Protection.

Lesson to be learned: be aware of your primary data partition encryption status. Know where your encryption recovery (escrow) keys are stored.

External SSD

Peter is a wedding photographer. He bought an external SSD drive to store images and videos that he showed to his clients. Since Full HD videos are large, he wanted the fastest portable storage solution to minimize transfer times.

Samsung USB3.1 SSD Drive

At first, he was very happy with his new SSD. The disk was writing video files at 450 MB/s. It took less than 10 minutes to fill up the drive. Unfortunately for Peter, after just a few sessions, the SSD was no longer that fast. Write speeds dropped dramatically. Instead of 10 minutes, Peter now had to wait half an hour just to save files to his SSD drive. Did he get a defective drive?

An important fact about the SSD technology is that SSD drives are only fast when writing data into empty (erased) cells. If he used the full capacity of his SSD drive, deleted the files, and started writing a new set of data, the SSD controller would have to erase data blocks before it could store new data. Erasing is slow, so SSD manufacturers implemented trimming and background garbage collection in their drives. Trim does not work over a USB connection, and so the external SSD drive demonstrated dramatic decrease in write speeds.

Lesson to be learned: advertised transfer rates can be misleading. “Up to 450 MB/s” write speeds may only apply to external (USB) SSD drives while they are brand new. Once the disk is filled up, its write speeds may drop dramatically unless the device works as part of the UASP environment.

External SSD 2

Peter returned his first external SSD, but he still needed a fast external storage device. He read some online forums and discovered that a new communication protocol had been introduced for external SSD drives. The UASP (USB-attached SCSI Protocol) compliant devices could potentially allow reaching higher transfer speeds while supporting trim.

Peter went ahead and bought a (much more expensive) UASP model. While this model looked similar to his original drive and still used a USB port to connect to Peter’s computer, its performance was consistently at a high level. Peter enjoyed sustained write speeds of 450 MB/s over and over again.

Lesson to be learned: some USB SSD drives do in fact support trim (via SCSI “unmap” command). We can no longer safely assume that all external USB enclosures are trim-less.

Conclusion

In this article, we tried to cover the changes that have happened in development of SSD and eMMC since the publication of our previous article on the topic in 2014 and explain significance of these trends for forensics. Some old things remained unchanged, some got new tweaks to them in reaction to progressing technology, but if we were to note one trend important for forensics, it would be the fact that the majority of SSD manufacturers have not been competing in terms of technological advancement. Instead, “cheaper and cheaper” has been the name of the game. Thus we have today’s entry-level SSD drives with advertised write speeds of 130-180 MB/s (compare that to 450-500 MB/s of two year old SSDs). Sustained performance is even worse, with shady NAND cells and weak controllers hindering performance.

Why does it all matter to SSD forensics? Because many recent-generation SSD drives do not have features that seemed mandatory just two years ago. In particular, many drives do not support DZAT or even DRAT (see our original article for definitions). Moreover, some Sandforce-based SSDs (such as the new Intel 535 series) do not even trim properly due to the way the controller implements data compression. As a result, you are much more likely to be able to recover information from a recently made, budget SSD drive.

About Belkasoft

Founded in 2002, Belkasoft is a global leader in digital forensics technology, known for their sound and comprehensive forensic tools. With a team of professionals in digital forensics, data recovery and reverse engineering, Belkasoft focuses on creating technologically advanced yet easy-to-use products for investigators and forensic experts to make their work easier, faster, and more effective.

With this focus in mind, Belkasoft introduces their flagship product, Belkasoft Evidence Center – an easy-to-use, integrated solution for collecting and analyzing digital evidence from mobile and computer devices. Customers in law enforcement, police, military, business, intelligence agencies, and forensic laboratories in 70+ countries worldwide use Belkasoft Evidence Center to fight homicide, crimes against children, drug trafficking, data leakage, fraud, and other online and offline crimes.

Request a free fully functional trial of Belkasoft Evidence Center: belkasoft.com/trial

About authors

Oleg Afonin is an author, expert, and consultant in computer forensics.

Yuri Gubanov is a renowned digital forensics expert. He is a frequent speaker at industry-known conferences such as CEIC, HTCIA, TechnoSecurity, FT-Day, DE-Day and others. Yuri is the Founder and CEO of Belkasoft, the manufacturer of digital forensic software empowering police departments in about 70 countries. With years of experience in digital forensics and security domain, Yuri led forensic training courses for multiple law enforcement departments in several countries. You can add Yuri Gubanov to your LinkedIn network at http://linkedin.com/in/yurigubanov.

Contacting the authors

You can contact the authors via email: research@belkasoft.com

Follow Belkasoft on Twitter: https://twitter.com/Belkasoft

Subscribe to the blog: https://belkasoft.wordpress.com

About Belkasoft Research

Belkasoft Research is based in St. Petersburg State University, performing non-commercial researches and scientific activities. A list of articles by Belkasoft Research can be found at belkasoft.com/articles.


Hiding Data from Forensic Imagers – Using the Service Area of a Hard Disk Drive

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By Todd G. Shipley and Bryan Door

(A complete copy of this white paper and its figures, images and diagrams can be found at www.nfdrtc.net).

I. Summary

Kaspersky Labs® recently released their research regarding the compromise of hard disk drive firmware. This has confirmed our long standing suspicion that data hiding techniques using a hard disk drives Service Area could be used for malicious purposes.  Kaspersky Labs® identified a group of attackers, dubbed the Equation Group, reportedly having close ties to the groups responsible for writing Stuxnet and Flame.  The “Equation Group” is reported to have run the most advanced hacking operation ever uncovered (Goodin 2015).  This group is reported to have used firmware update techniques to create a “secret storage vault” to store data in the firmware of the compromised hard drives. Thus allowing the storage of data including the malware itself allowing the ability to survive standard format and wiping operations.   Our previous paper, Forensic Imaging of Hard Disk Drives – What we thought we knew, describes the relatively unknown hard disk drive Service Area and its firmware modules. The firmware on a standard hard disk drive is located in two locations: 1) the ROM chip located on the PCB, and 2) a physical location on the platters of the hard disk as we describe.  What is not revealed, as of the initial reports from Kaspersky Labs® is the exact location of the firmware hack, the ROM or the Service Area modules.

In Goodin’s article he made the statement While it’s simple for end users to re-flash their hard drives using executable files provided by manufacturers, it’s just about impossible for an outsider to reverse engineer a hard drive, read the existing firmware, and create malicious versions.”  We do not want to downplay the complexity of this attack, however, we would like to demonstrate in this paper the fact that there are multiple commercial tools available on the market that provide the functionality needed to easily read from and write to a hard drives Service Area.  “The firmware area / system area of the drive is not accessible during the normal operation of the drive and subsequently is not addressable by the average user or the operating system.” (2010 Davies and Sutherland). The practice of manipulating firmware in both the ROM and the Service Area is a daily occurrence for professional data recovery companies.  In this paper, we will detail how data other than firmware can be added to a firmware module in the Service Area and hidden from traditional forensic imaging.

II. Background

As forensic examiners we have all known or heard about “Hiding” data in blocks marked “BAD” this is nothing new. But what if we could hide data in the “Reserved” area blocks? This area is not a user accessible area and is not imaged by the normal imaging tools. What about hiding data in the space reserved for the hard disk drive’s Service Area (also referred to as the System Area)? We have previously written about the Service Area in the white paper “Forensic Imaging of Hard Disk-What we thought we knew” (Shipley and Door 2012). The research in this paper has been ongoing for several years and is an outgrowth of work we did for the U.S. DOJ National Institute of Justice. What we are discussing here regarding the Service Area is fairly commonly known in the data recovery industry, but not in the digital forensics field.  What we hope to provide the digital forensics field is an understanding of a known vulnerability to our forensic processes that to date has been undocumented in the field.

The Service Area of a hard disk drive is used to store manufacturer data such as servo information, firmware, and the drive defects tables such as the P and G-Lists and translation table. The hard disk drive “SMART” data we are familiar with is also stored here.  The Service Area will contain many files referred to as “modules”.  With the knowledge that this space exists on a hard disk drive, and that we can access the space, the question is can we write something other than the manufacturer specific firmware modules to this space?

Well, the answer is it’s possible”. In practice it’s not as simple as clicking “Save” in Windows. The Service Area modules often have checksums and pre-determined physical space limitations that need to be overcome. However, working within these limitations, data can be added to the Service Area.  The problem is that this data is unseen by the current forensic imaging tools and uncollected in any current form of basic computer forensic review. This data area of the hard disk drives has had no review from the digital forensics community. We hope that with this paper and our ongoing research, we will add new and revealing information to the digital forensics field.

This paper is only intended to be a proof of concept to provide the digital forensic community with the knowledge of certain tool’s ability to hide data in the Service Area of a hard disk drive. The technique described in this paper makes the data added to the Service Area of a hard disk drive invisible to the current forensic imaging tools.  This in no way diminishes what the imagers do in conjunction with imaging the Logical Block Address space of a hard disk drive. It only proves that there are areas on the hard drive that are not addressed by the traditional forensic process and this fact needs to be understood by the industry as a whole.

Some things to consider in the future are the potential for specific malicious abuse of this space by others. This space could not only be exploited by criminals seeking to hide data from law enforcement investigators, but it could also provide an avenue of compromise for hackers that none of the current virus or malware products consider. As we have already seen in articles (Goodin 2015 and Fisher) on the exploitation of hard drive firmware the reality of further abuse is probable.

III. Proposed Methodology

To provide a model for the proof of concept, we developed a process that could be repeated and validated by others in the field given the same tools and similar drives used in the process.

To accomplish the proof of concept, the design of the process included three phases.  The three phases were designed to be a repeatable process and designed to allow replication:

Phase 1 a)         Data will be hidden in the hard drive Service Area

b)        Hard disk drive will be wiped.

A sample file will be hashed and then stored in a module in the hard disk drive’s Service Area.  The hard drive will then be wiped.  The hard drive will then be imaged and hashed.

 

Phase 2 Attempt to find hidden data using traditional forensic methodology.
The drive will be given to a non-involved digital forensic examiner to image, hash, and examine.  The examiner will attempt to find the Sample Evidence using any of the industry standard computer forensic tool(s).  After the non-involved digital forensic examiner verifies that the sample evidence cannot be found on the drive it will be provided to a third examiner to be extracted.

 

Phase 3 Data will be extracted by third examiner.
This third examiner will be in possession of tools to allow access to hard drive’s Firmware and the Service Area of the hard disk drive.  The hard disk drive will be imaged and hashed to verify that there have been no changes made to the hard disk drive.  The firmware modules will be extracted from the hard disk drive. The module containing the sample evidence will be reviewed and the sample evidence will be extracted and hashed.

Some might think that this is cumbersome to use three separate examiners to complete the process, but we wanted to show that independently the data could be added, reviewed for the data using normal digital forensic imaging and process and then examined by a third examiner who could then extract the hidden data. This is intended to show that the digital forensic process could be manipulated to send data between two users and not be found. The third examiner could be told the location of the data or not. Extraction of the Service Area data and then carving for the image would find it. Either way, access to the right tools can allow retrieval of the hidden data. Additional hiding techniques could include encrypting the data secreted in the Service Area that could prevent a general scan or carving from finding the data.

IV. Tools used during testing

The following tools were used to conduct the proof of concept outline in the paper. Each was selected for its purpose in the process to aid in the insertion of the data into the Service Area of the hard disk drives used in the examples. These tools are available on the general market and nothing used was proprietarily built for this project. We felt that it was necessary to use commercial off the shelf tools to demonstrate the fact this could be done with relative ease using these tools. The primary tools used in the project included, but others exist that could be used in this process, are:

FTK Imager, by Access Data (www.accessdata.com) X-ways Forensic tool (www.xways.com)
PC3000 UDMA, by Ace Laboratory’s (www.acelabratory.com) Free Hex Editor Neo (http://www.hhdsoftware.com)
Atola Insight, by Atola Technologies (www.atola.com) EnCase, by Guidance Software (www.guidancesoftware.com)

V. Proof of Concept Methodology

We elected to design a method for the proof of concept that could be repeatable by anyone with the listed tools. This is not the only method of potential insertion of data into the Services Area of a hard disk drive, but is one that provides an easily documentable method that can be validated by others in the industry. In Table 1.0 we outline the methodology we used in the design of the project.

 

Table 1.0 Project Methodology
1.      Select hard disk drive that will allow for the Service Area to be manipulated into allowing data to be added to a module or track
2.      Wipe the LBA space of the hard drive using stand industry tools and hash drive.
3.      Select traceable data file to add to the Service Area and Hash.
4.      Back up Service Area of the selected hard drive.
5.      Examiner 1 using a data recovery tool adds selected data to a Service Area Module of the hard disk drive.
6.      Examiner 2, a non-involved digital forensic examiner, is given the hard drive with instructions to hash the drive and examine the drive for data.
7.      Examiner 2 will provide the hard disk drive to examiner 3 after reporting findings.
8.      Examiner 3 will Hash the hard drive to ensure the drive Hash matches the ones completed by Examiners 1 and 2.
9.      Examiner 3, in possession of applicable data recovery tools to allow access to hard drive firmware, will extract the data placed in the Service Area by Examiner 1 and hash the data file to ensure a match to examiner 1’s data.
10.  The drive can be Hashed again to prove no changes were made to the data area by the process.

VI. HOW WE DID IT, A STEP BY STEP LOOK AT THE PROCESS

Step 1-Hard Drive Used in Testing

As a proof of concept we used an older commonly found Western Digital WD400BB hard disk drive (As we note below this can be done with other hard disk drives).

Table 1. Western Digital Source Drive
Manufacturer Western Digital  WD400 HDD
Model WD400 (3.5 inch)
Firmware HSCHNTJAH
Size 40 GB (LBA 78165360)
Serial number WMAJ71426990

Step 2-Wipe the LBA Space of the test hard drive

The source hard disk drive used in the test was wiped using the PC3000 wiping functions.  The target hard disk drive was then Hashed using the “Verify Drive/Image” function of FTK Imager v 3 and a Wiebetech write blocker.  The MD5 Hash value of the hard disk drive was:

f9731af00046f8afcdfc29dab1c1f05e

  Step 3- Select traceable data file to add to Service Area and hash

The following image file was selected for its size to allow it to be added to the selected module. Experimentally the file size is small so that we could ensure the insertion into a single module in the Service area of the source hard disk drive:

Table 2. Inserted Image File
File Name NFDRTC Logo.bmp  Hidden image
Size 35kb
MD5 Hash Value 4de173b217e46e1ae7eaf52e9c9b9485

Step 4- Examiner 1 -Back up Service Area of the selected hard disk drive.

Using the PC-3000, by Ace laboratories, we backed up the Service Area of the source hard disk drive. This is done through the software by connecting the hard disk drive to the PC3000 internal card. We started the PC3000 software, provided power to the hard disk drive through the PC3000 and ran the auto identify button. Once the hard disk drive was identified we entered the hard drive specific screen that will allow for the backing up of the Service Area of the hard disk drive.

Step 5- Examiner 1 using data recovery tools adds selected data to a Service Area Module of the hard disk drive.

WD400 modules

Figure 1 – Screen shot of WD400BB modules view in PC3000

Once the Service Area was backed-up, we could then insert the data from the image file into the selected module. The module used in this proof of concept was called “60”. This module was identified for use in the project due to its size and relative insignificance to the operation of the hard disk drive.

Add data to selected module in the hard disk drive Service Area.

The saved module “60” was opened with the PC3000 Hex Editor. This allowed access to the hexadecimal view of the data module.

Hex of Module 60.jpg

Figure 2 – Hex view of Module 60 with Image file inserted

The image file also opened in the hex editor and the data was copied and pasted into the selected module 60. The image data was added after the Modules header and the modules data area. The modified module was then saved.

Using the PC3000 PCI, the module existing module was opened in the “View” mode. The modified module was uploaded to the hard disk drive and was written to the hard disk drives Service Area (these are normal functions of the PC3000 usually intended for module repair of damaged hard disk drives). In the PC3000 module view the checksum was re-calculated for the new modified module, and was written to the hard disk drive. The rewriting of the checksum for the module identifies the module as working correctly.

Module 60 Header

Figure 3 – Module 60 Header

The hard disk drive was shut down and then removed from the PC3000.

Step 6- Examiner 2, a non-involved digital forensic examiner, was given the hard drive with instructions to hash the drive and examine the drive for data.

The hard disk drive was provided to an uninvolved computer forensic examiner. The instructions provided to the examiner were to image the hard disk drive using industry standard tools and process of their choice. They were to obtain a hash value for the hard disk drive and determine if any images existed on the hard disk drive. The examiner was provided with a digital copy of the concealed image file, along with its hash value, and told it was hidden on the hard disk drive.

The MD5 Hash value of the hard disk drive as identified by the examiner was:

f9731af00046f8afcdfc29dab1c1f05e

The results for Examiner 2 were that the Hash value Examiner 2 obtained for the hard disk drive matched the Hash value made after inserting the image file in the Service Area. The Examiner 2 found no data on the hard disk drive or an image matching the hash of the concealed image (Examiner 2 did note the hard disk drive was wiped). Examiner 2 used X-ways Forensics to examine the hard disk drive (Authors Note: Any of the conventional digital forensics tools would have had the same results).

Step 7 – Examiner 2 provided the hard disk drive to examiner 3 after reporting findings.

The drive was then turned over to the second author as the third examiner.

Step 8 – Examiner 3 Hashed the hard drive using EnCase Forensic Software to ensure the hard disk drive Hash matches the ones completed by Examiners 1 and 2.

The MD5 Hash value of the hard disk drive as identified by Examiner 3 as:

f9731af00046f8afcdfc29dab1c1f05e

 

Table 3. EnCase Forensic Image Information
Name SA TEST 1
Examiner Name Bryan Door
Label WDC WD40
Model 0BB-22HEA1
Serial Number WD-WMAJ71426990
File Integrity Completely Verified, 0 Errors
Acquisition MD5 f9731af00046f8afcdfc29dab1c1f05e

This Hash calculated by EnCase matched the previous hash values obtained by Examiner 1 and Examiner 2 with other Hashing tools.

Step 9 – Examiner 3, in possession of applicable data recovery tools to allow access to hard drive firmware, will extract the data placed in the Service Area by Examiner 1 and hash the data file to ensure a match to examiner 1’s data.

Using the Atola Insight data recovery tool, the source hard disk drive’s Service Area Modules were backed up. The module containing the image file was extracted from the backed up modules folder. The concealed file was extracted from the module “60” using a Hex Editor and saved as an image file. Examiner 3 Hashed the image and matched his hash to the original file Hash obtained prior to insertion in the Service Area module.

Atola Insight Module 60

Figure 4 – Atola Insight firmware backup and Module 60 content

 

The image file was extracted from firmware module 60 using a standard Hex Editor.  The data copied from module 60 was pasted into a new file within the Hex Editor program and named test.bmp.

Hex of Extracted Module 60

Figure 5 – Hex Editor used to extract the image file from module 60

 

The newly created file named test.bmp was added to EnCase and hashed.  The MD5 Hash value of the inserted image file as identified by the Examiner 3 was:

 

4de173b217e46e1ae7eaf52e9c9b9485

Encase ID of Extracted Image

Figure 6 – EnCase Forensic Tool identifying Image in Extracted Service Area Data

 

Step 10 – The drive was Hashed again to prove no changes were made to the data area by the process.

 The hard drive was Hashed using FTK Imager v 3.  The MD5 Hash value of hard disk drive was:

 

f9731af00046f8afcdfc29dab1c1f05e

VII. ADDITIONAL FUTURE RESEARCH

 Upon completion of the initial proof of concept, the authors did not want to leave this project to a single hard disk drive as the sole basis for the paper. We reviewed the service area of numerous hard disk drives and with a small amount of investigation into unnecessary modules we were able to add data (text and small image files) to a variety of hard drives. This ability to add data to individual hard disk drives Service Area ran across multiple manufacturers and drive models. Data was added to 2.5” and 3.5” drive’s, and PATA and SATA drives (Author Note: No attempt was made at this time to add data to SCSI or SAS drives but the principle is the same).

Future research needs include:  1) More examination of the Hard Disk Drive Service Area to determine the implications this area has on forensic investigations and it’s ability to store data normally unseen by digital forensic examiners 2) Detailed documentation of Hard Disk Drives Service Area modules needs to be conducted and 3) Exploration of the ability to store and retrieve data in the service area from a live operating system.

VIII. CONCLUSION

This proof of concept was intended to provide the digital forensic examiner with information not previously written about or discussed elsewhere.  We hope that this proof of concept brings to light more information regarding an area of hard disk drives that is not well understood by the general digital forensic community and requires further research. It was also intended to prove the limitations of current Forensic Imaging tools and how we as digital forensic examiners need to consider potential new areas of examination when dealing with hard disk drives.

The reader also needs to be aware that the current breed of Forensic Imagers was never designed to address the data in the Service Area of a hard disk drive. Accessing the firmware and modules of a hard disk drive, which contain programs and configuration settings needed by the drive to operate, can only be done currently by a very small number of tools. None of these tools are standard tools for the digital forensic field.

The take away from this paper is the knowledge that what we thought about forensic imaging is different from the actual mechanical operation of the hard disk drives. Forensic examiners need to be aware of the potential for data to be hidden in these generally inaccessible areas of the hard disk drive.

IX. REFERENCES

Davies, Gaeth and Sutherland, Iain (2010) Hard Disk Storage: Firmware Manipulation and Forensic Impact and Current Best Practice ,  ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2010 55, retrieved July 25, 2016 https://www.google.com/url?q=http://proceedings.adfsl.org/index.php/CDFSL/article/download/93/91&sa=U&ved=0ahUKEwiH1bmM5YbOAhVFthQKHZdRB-IQFggQMAI&sig2=plmc7d0cH-sj21YspAYP7Q&usg=AFQjCNG2rQ0YWMCCi3U1iHw04KpKX5YAdQ

Fisher, Dennis  (2015) The recent articles Massive, Decades-Long Cyberespionage Framework Uncovered,http://threatpost.com/massive-decades-long-cyberespionage-framework-uncovered/111080

Goodin, Dan (2015) How “omnipotent” hackers tied to NSA hid for 14 years—and were found at last, http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/02/how-omnipotent-hackers-tied-to-the-nsa-hid-for-14-years-and-were-found-at-last/

Shipley, T. & Door, B. (2012) Forensic Imaging of Hard Disk Drives – What we thought we knew, https://articles.forensicfocus.com/2012/01/27/forensic-imaging-of-hard-disk-drives-what-we-thought-we-knew-2/

www.bit-chasers.com   and  www.cadatarecovery.com, California Data Recovery

www.greatbasindatarecovery.com, Great Basin Data Recovery

www.nfdrtc.net, The National Forensic Data Recovery Training Center

 

 


Meeting A Forensic Challenge: Recovering Data From A Jolla Smartphone

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by Davide Gabrini, Andrea Ghirardini, Mattia Epifani and Francesco Acchiappati

Preface

During the hacking camp MOCA 2016, at the end of a talk held by Davide “Rebus” Gabrini on passcode circumvention methods on mobile devices, a bystander offered an intriguing challenge: he offered for research purposes a smartphone to find out if and how someone could crack it, overcome security and extract information.

The smartphone was a Jolla White 16GB JP-1301, equipped with the Sailfish 2.0.1.11 operating system. The device was previously reset twice by the owner and it was protected by a 5-digit PIN without encryption on the internal storage. Moreover, the developer mode was not active because it required a Jolla account that was not available.

The challenge was accepted during the following End Summer Camp 2016 (ESC 2016), where a dream team of Italian forensic experts addressed the problem at the Ville Forensics, among the curious eyes of other hackers. The team was composed of Davide “Rebus” Gabrini, Andrea “Pila” Ghirardini, Mattia “Lo Zio” Epifani and Francesco “Swappage” Acchiappati.

Acquisition

The phone did not expose a service similar to ADB like on Android devices, but only the internal data partition as a Mass Storage Device*. In this case it is possible to perform a logical copy of the visible files and folders, but we are bound to the MTP protocol limitations; although the user data exposed in this way can be significant, the method is still partial and unsatisfactory.

As expected, attempts to acquire the device using well known forensics products like UFED4PC and Magnet Acquire failed, as these tools couldn’t even detect the device at all.

*For accessing the internal storage, the device must be unlocked, and therefore the passcode is required.

Physical Examination

When tackling a challenge, the first step is to know your enemy, therefore the handset was dismantled in its entirety and the motherboard exposed. All connectors were ZIF and the shields were partially interlocking and partially attached using clips on the mainboard.

Two things stood out.

The first is that SOC is not visible since is a SOC with POP for RAM on top, so the big chip with 3TA78 D9QMM codes on top  is a RAM chip (produced by Micron) which hides the Qualcomm SOC behind (kudos Andrea Barisani).

SEQ Illustration \* ARABIC1: Device motherboard with a MediaTek SOC installed

SEQ Illustration \* ARABIC1: Device motherboard with a MediaTek SOC installed

The second is that there are a plethora of test pads on the mainboard. From a certain point of view this helps, but on the other hand it does not allow to easily find and understand which are the ones needed for accessing at a service level (JTAG where are you? Please reveal yourself!)

SEQ Illustration \* ARABIC2: A quick look at the test pads on the motherboard

SEQ Illustration \* ARABIC2: A quick look at the test pads on the motherboard

We also tried to connect the phone without battery through the USB port the system to check if it has a behavior similar of a MediaTek SOC based device that, when connected over USB without battery, exposes a USB interface from which it’s possible to perform a system flash or memory dump.

By adopting a procedure found on the Internet:

  1. remove the battery
  2. insert the battery while holding the volume down button
  3. while holding the volume down, press power and keep it pressed until the phone vibrates
  4. release power and volume down
    the system goes into recovery mode.

When connected in this mode, the device is being heralded as a new USB device named “Generic RNDIS device”. On Microsoft Windows 10 the driver is not loaded automatically, but if you proceed by manually installing a “Generic RNDIS device” driver among those written by Microsoft, the device is properly recognized as a network card.

By connecting the phone to a Linux operating system, the device is instead immediately recognized as a USB Ethernet adapter. We could then enable the interface and notice that the phone runs a DHCP daemon that assigns an IP address to the computer.

The phone only exposes the port 23 (telnet); once inside, without being asked for any kind of authentication, it provides the access to a shell with root privileges.

Running the mount command to check the list of file systems we realized that the main partition of the system is not mounted, and the device (/dev/ mmcblk0) has a GPT partitioning with 28 partitions.

A recovery system based on Linux is undoubtedly an aid, as it’s already equipped with the whole toolchain that is needed to perform a physical acquisition of the phone’s flash memory: there are both “dd” and “netcat”, and therefore the easiest method is to use the existing network connection between the computer and Jolla’s smartphone to perform a “dd over netcat” acquisition.

This procedure requires a netcat listening on the virtual Ethernet of the computer (there are also many ports for windows platform) on an arbitrary port (ex. 8888), and then to launch these commands:

first on the computer:
nc -lvp 8888 | dd of=/path/to/destination/image.raw
and then on the phone:
dd if=/dev/mmcblk0 conv=noerror,sync | nc [ip of the PC interface] 8888

The whole process takes about 3 hours, but the result is a full physical extraction of the internal device flash memory, which we can now analyze using our favorite tools.

CHINEX

Since the phone disassembly revealed the use of an MTK processor, we also attempted the acquisition through the Chinex kit that is available with UFED from Cellebrite, but we didn’t succeed since the device couldn’t successfully pass the MTK Pinfind procedure. We had the same behavior using the other methods available for generic MTK devices.

Analysis

Once the acquisition was successfully completed, we obtained a 16GB bit stream image.

The first thing we wanted to check out was the partitioning. To achieve this goal we opened the image with X-Ways Forensics. GPT partitioning was interpreted correctly by the software and 28 partitions were detected. That made us think: great, we are the champions!😛

Another unlucky attempt was using UFED Physical Analyzer: predefined profiles, script chains configured for MTK processors and individual Python plugins were not able to extract useful information from the raw dump. The best result we get was with a generic profile for MTK device, which seemed to point out a few email messages and deleted messages but then we realized that most of them were false positives. Again a dry shot.

Another part of the team started analyzing the individual partitions with X-Ways Forensics and found out that the largest ones (and therefore potentially containing juicy information) were number 24 (Linux Swap, even if it was recognized as “Linux Filesystem”, as big as 500 MB) and number 28 (13.5 GB). Unfortunately, we had another issue: the partition is formatted with the bleeding edge BTRFS file system, which, while we are writing this document, is not supported by either X-Ways or UFED PA. We had the same outcome during image inspection with FTK Imager and Autopsy, but the same would also be achieved by Encase or FTK: none of the most popular forensic analysis software, yet, supports BTRFS. But Linux does!

We then decided to “split” the work: someone decided to mount the file system on a Linux workstation for pulling out a TAR archive containing all the allocated data, while the remaining team members started to carve at raw level searching for information and fragments of meaningful content.

The first activity was completed successfully and the TAR file was turned back to X-Ways Forensics: as we could have expected, existing files on the device do not contain any data because the device had been reset by the owner before the delivery.

So what was left to explore was the path of the unknown: the raw data. We started with a byte-level carving with X-Ways Forensics and PhotoRec, while seeking more structured information with Internet Evidence Finder (IEF) and Bulk Extractor.

After a few seconds X-Ways extracted pictures related to Internet browsing activities on medical websites and shortly after both IEF and Bulk Extractor provided a long series of keywords used on Google and related to a specific medical treatment. The carving continued and some SQLite databases were detected (569 by X-Ways, over 600 by PhotoRec). Among them we identify the Cookies database, which provided us with the URL to which the medical images belong: we were then able to pinpoint the Google search and medical web site access to a specific date and time.

We continued with the file carving and we found the screenshots of a GPS application, probably the one that was installed by default on the system. From these screenshots it was possible to figure out where and how the owner moved with the device and, in some cases, it was possible to determine exactly the origin and destination of the trip.

As a final activity we decided to try to trace communications with third parties in an attempt to uncover as much as possible about the identity of the device owner. We managed to extract a complete email in EML format: in this email we found the sender and the recipient, indicating the name, last name and, of course, the email address.

At this point we launched a keyword search using the address of the sender and recipient, and this allowed us to recover about 400 matches: a detailed analysis of the results allowed to recover about 200 email messages, only partially overwritten but full of information about the owner’s job and several customers’ names. We of course also found private and personal emails exchanged on the phone.

At this point we decided to stop as the collected results were enough to prove that even when a phone is not supported by common forensic tools and is subjected to reset, it is possible to successfully retrieve meaningful data useful during investigations!

Happy with the results, we decided that it was time to move on to the next beer, but not before enjoying the phone owner’s reaction and his face going pale, when we began asking him if he knew anything about the subject matter and whether he had been in certain places.

ESC “Ville Forensics” beats Jolla Phone 2-0 (at least!).


10 DFIR Blogs You Don’t Want to Miss

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by Christa M. Miller

Digital forensics is a tough job. Forensicators must evolve as rapidly as the technology does, which means being in a constant state of learning. Formal education is costly and can’t keep up. The next best alternative: learn from others’ experience.

It can be a challenge, however, to share one’s forensication expertise on an ongoing basis. Nondisclosure agreements, time, and effort all present a challenge when you’re a forensicator with a life. Those who make it work, however, deserve special recognition for fueling the DFIR community with the information examiners need to understand where their results come from, how to do better, more accurate work, and overall keep moving forward.

llll

These ten blogs are among the very best, selected for their post frequency, validation by community members throughout social media and venues like the Forensic 4cast Awards, and links from other blogs.*

10. A kilo of forensic resources

The result of digital forensic research conducted on his own time, Dan Pullega’s 4n6k posts only about two or three times per year, but is rich with technical detail, even the succinctly explained “Forensics Quickies” and information about his own and others’ scripts. Pullega also links to his active DFIR Subreddit from this page.

9. Forensication in the Arizona desert

Tuscon (Arizona)-based incident responder Mari DeGrazia has run Another Forensics Blog since 2012. Although she offers only a few updates per year, those she publishes are tutorials rich with how-tos. DeGrazia also offers a number of her own tools for download, together with blog tutorials on how to use them. She’s responsive to commenters who pinpoint errors, encourages requests for updates and even help with parsing artifacts, and meticulously documents her tools’ place in the larger DFIR ecosystem.

8. DFIR from the City of Angels

Posting an average of once or twice per month, James Habben’s 4n6ir, a newer blog (it just celebrated its first blogoversary, or is that birthday?) that mixes problem-and-solution technical posts with more career-oriented information about report-writing, soliciting peer reviews of reports, and dealing with the most difficult of cases. Habben also offers a short list of Python scripts for those interested in learning the language.

7. Vendor-neutral Mac forensics

It might appear difficult to separate Mac forensics from the vendors who develop tools to perform it, which is why Sarah Edwards’ Mac4n6 blog is on this list. Edwards, a SANS instructor, has long been known for her expertise. Once or twice a month since 2015, she has aggregated resources from other blogs, papers, presentations in video and printed form, other media such as webcasts, and tools, including her own, which include tutorials and extensive documentation for her own scripts. Edwards also publishes calls for papers from around the community, so if you’re interested in publishing research on Apple forensics, be sure to subscribe to Sarah’s blog!

6. Mixing technical and business value

New kid on the block Gillware Digital Forensics is the brainchild of Cindy Murphy, a noted expert on mobile device forensics. This blog is the youngest of this set, but already has accolades from the community as a strong resource. Mobile malware, NAND memory data recovery, and artifacts from popular apps have all been covered in the two months since the blog’s inception, along with case studies, best practices, and more personal reflections from Murphy’s 30-year career.

5. A six-year journey through DFIR

Corey Harrell’s Journey into Incident Response has been around since 2010, and has enough content that he’s divided his “Search” function into four different custom categories: digital forensics, vulnerabilities, active threats, and malware analysis. Harrell has posted less in recent years, but still tells great stories and might even be considered one of DFIR’s great philosophers. Be sure to check out Harrell’s “Journey into IR Methodology” aggregation of the posts he’s written about the six levels of incident response; there are many more posts than just six, making this a valuable resource for those interested or just beginning in IR.

4. A steady team effort on memory forensics

Memory is about the only volatile aspect of the blog run by Volatility Labs’ AAron Walters, Jamie Levy, Andrew Case, and Michael Ligh. It’s been one of the DFIR community’s go-to resources for memory forensics and malware analysis since 2012. It offers tutorials as well as updates for Volatility training and tools, and, of course, the annual Volatility plugin contest. You can also find details on projects that build on the Volatility framework, as well as events where you can plan to attend team members’ presentations. Be sure to check out the authors’ book “The Art of Memory Forensics”, and of course, access the Volatility code from GitHub!

3. In search of forensic spoils

A newer, but fairly prolific blog with two to three posts per month, Eric Zimmerman’s Binary Foray offers in-depth forensic tool testing, as well as his own open-source tools for download and testing. His work builds on both direct feedback from the community, as well as his own response to other forensicators’ work. Be sure to look for Zimmerman’s forensic suite benchmarks, including his recent post comparing X-Ways, various EnCase versions, and Autopsy, and his imaging speed tests.

2. Monkeying around with digital forensics

Adrian Leong, the Cheeky 4n6 Monkey, has blogged on average once a month since 2011. Leong is the author of a great many Python and Perl scripts available from his GitHub (you can find them from his blog); in addition to in-depth technical posts, he has good information about the professional side of forensic work. In particular, Leong’s follow-up from his panel at the SANS DFIR Summit delves into creativity, the scientific method, perseverance, collaboration, and luck. Read it with the same attention you would devote to his technical posts!

1. An online forensicators’ community

Weekly community updates can be essential to an informed and involved populace, which is why Phill Moore’s This Week in 4n6 stands out. Since January 2016, Moore has run this regular roundup of the industry’s latest tools and releases, malware research, presentations, and other goodies from the community. The extent of activity across the industry is apparent from this in-depth blog; big-picture thinkers will appreciate the ability to see context and connections in the different groupings.

No “top 10 DF / IR blogs” list would be complete without a mention of the true lions of blogging, the people who consistently post in sharing their experiences and expertise. Harlan Carvey has maintained Windows Incident Response for more than a decade, as has Didier Stevens with his blog; meanwhile, Hacking Exposed Computer Forensics editors Dave Cowen and James Alwood haven’t posted since April of this year — but Cowen, along with Matthew Seyer, is also behind the twice-a-month Forensic Lunch video stream and podcast.

Other blogs to watch: Digital Forensics Tips, Larry Daniel’s Ex Forensis, Brian Moran’s BriMor Labs, Champlain College’s Computer & Digital Forensics Blog, Chad Tilbury’s Forensic Methods, Ken Pryor’s Digital Forensics Blog, and Jamie Levy’s JL’s Stuff all update less frequently than those listed above, but nonetheless have valuable information that’s worth checking out.

*Disclaimer: it’s impossible to work in and around the digital forensics community for long without coming to know people personally. I’ve interacted with everyone on this list and have known most for some time; while my methods may have been less than purely scientific, they do represent an intent to be as objective as possible. If I’ve missed any, please be sure to share in the comments!

Christa M. Miller has worked as a marketing and public relations professional for digital forensics and incident response vendors for the past seven years. While seeking new employment, she continues to write and edit in both personal and professional pursuits. She is based with her family in South Carolina, USA and, besides writing, enjoys traveling, reading, hiking, storms, and breezy summer afternoons in her hammock.


InSig2 LawTech 2016 – Brussels 7th – 8th November

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From the 7th – 8th of November 2016, Forensic Focus will be attending InSig2’s Law Tech Europe conference in Brussels, Belgium. If there are any topics you’d particularly like us to cover, or any speakers you think we should interview, please let us know in the comments.

Below is an overview of the subjects and speakers that will be featured at Law Tech Europe.

Monday 7th November

ltec-electronic-evidence-digital-forensics-cyber-securityThe conference will begin with a keynote speech by Nicolas Petit, Professor of Law at the University of Liege. Petit will cover the subject of artificial intelligence tools for lawyers and their impact on the business of law.

Following the opening session, the conference will split into three streams which will allow delegates to choose presentations that are relevant to their interests. One stream will look at eDiscovery, beginning with chat messages in Bloomberg Vault and how to collect data from them. Karyn Harty from McCann Fitzgerald will then lead the second session, in which arguments for the use of predictive coding in investigatory contexts will be put forward.

EU data privacy and cross-border data transfer will be considered later in the day, along with various ways in which automation is making life easier for forensics and security experts. A panel discussion in the afternoon will look at computer assisted review and how this option is reducing investigative costs.

The digital forensics stream will first of all focus on a case study that will consider where the Amaro case in the UK went wrong. It will look at the challenges of investigating cases in which spyware has been accidentally downloaded onto a computer, and how to deal with such cases legally and fairly. Pierre Bernassau will then talk about machine translations and how they can help digital forensic professionals conduct investigations in an increasingly multilingual world.

In the early afternoon the digital forensics stream will be focusing on cross-border cooperation in organised crime investigations. There will then be a discussion of fraud investigation, followed by a panel discussion led by Zeno Geradts which will discuss network and memory forensics and the challenges of volatile evidence. The final session of the day will be another panel discussion, this time focusing on the topic of drones and how they can potentially aid in digital forensic investigations.

The computer security stream will be looking at hacking and its reputational impact for individuals and companies. Cell phone hacking will be the first subject of discussion, followed by a panel session considering how united Europe can and should be when fighting cybercrime.

Another panel discussion will follow, looking at national security versus personal data privacy. The challenges posed by digital communications for law enforcement agencies will be considered, along with difficult questions concerning how to weigh up people’s right to privacy with the necessity to investigate and prevent criminal activity.

The future of cybercrime will be the next topic of discussion in the computer security stream, followed by a presentation from Cameron Brown about how to properly investigate and prosecute cybercrime. The Panama Papers hack will be the final topic of the day, with a panel discussion looking at what went wrong and what firms can and should do in order to mitigate against such attacks.

Following Monday’s sessions there will be a networking dinner, which will give attendees the chance to continue the discussions begun throughout the day.

Tuesday 8th November

The second day of the conference will once again begin with a keynote address – topic and speaker TBC – and then will split into the same three streams for further discussions.

Adi Elliott from Epiq Systems will look at key trends in ediscovery and how the regulatory framework is constantly changing. A panel discussion in the afternoon will look at how law firms manage their collection and retention of electronic evidence, and how to ensure the safekeeping of sensitive information. The final session of the day will look at a Belgian case study that will highlight the current state of ediscovery tools in civil law jurisdictions, and what we can expect to see changing in the future.

The digital forensics stream will begin with a 101 from Michal Koczwara from ASOS, aimed at beginners or people who are considering a career in digital forensics but who have limited knowledge of the subject area. Robert Moody from Forensic Data Services will then take attendees through the anatomy of a security breach, looking at how attorneys around the world are targeted and how to protect your data as much as possible.

The penultimate session will look at image, video and sound forensics, including a rundown of available tools that are able to verify the authenticity of multimedia items. This will be followed by a panel discussion concerning advanced visual analytics and artificial intelligence in digital forensic investigations.

The computer security sessions will begin with an interesting discussion about the motivations for hacks – are people only doing it for the money, or are there other psychological factors at play? The advantages and disadvantages of cyber insurance will then be discussed by a panel, after which David Carvalho from CryptoHeroes will discuss ISO 27001 and PCI DSS compliance. The final session of the day will be a panel discussion about mobile security.

The Law Tech Europe Congress will be taking place in Brussels on the 7th-8th of November 2016. Forensic Focus members can get a 30% discount off the registration price by registering at http://www.cvent.com/d/sfqm63/4W and using the code XABQ812.


Malware Can Hide, But It Must Run

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by Alissa Torres, SANS Certified Instructor

It’s October, haunting season. However, in the forensics world, the hunting of evil never ends. And with Windows 10 expected to be the new normal, digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) professionals who lack the necessary (memory) hunting skills will pay the price.

Investigators who do not look at volatile memory are leaving evidence at the crime scene. RAM content holds evidence of user actions, as well as evil processes and furtive behaviors implemented by malicious code. It is this evidence that often proves to be the smoking gun that unravels the story of what happened on a system.

Although Microsoft is not expected to reach its Windows 10 rollout goal of one billion devices in the next two years, their glossiest OS to date currently makes up 22% of desktop systems according to netmarketshare.com[1]. By this time, as a forensic examiner, you have either encountered a Windows 10 system as the subject of an investigation or will in the near future. Significant changes introduced with Windows 10 (and actually with each new subsequent update) have required some “re-education” to learn what the “new normal” is.

Let’s jump in and check out the differences that Windows 10 has brought to the world of forensics by examining some key changes in the process list. In performing memory analysis, an investigator must understand the normal parent-child hierarchical relationships of native Windows processes. This is the essence of “know normal, find evil” and allows for effective and efficient analysis. Most of you have used the Edge browser which was released with Windows 10 in Summer 2015. Whereas Internet Explorer is typically launched by explorer.exe (run by default as the user’s initial process), Edge is spawned by the Runtime Broker process, which has a parent process of svchost (a system process). Edge runs as a Universal Windows Platform (UWP) application, one of the many Windows apps built to run on multiple types of devices. Runtime Broker manages permissions for Windows apps. This hierarchical process relationship deviates from one of the traditional analysis techniques we have relied on in past versions of Windows: System processes will have a parent/grandparent of the SYSTEM process and normal user processes, like browsers, will have parent lineage to explorer.exe. The screenshot below shows the hierarchical structures of a Win10 RTM system Build 10240 using Process Hacker tool.

Figure 1. Typical Hierarchy of Internet Explorer Process

Figure 1. Typical Hierarchy of Internet Explorer Process

Figure 2. Hierarchical Structure of Microsoft Edge and SearchUI Processes

Figure 2. Hierarchical Structure of Microsoft Edge and SearchUI Processes

Other new additions to the Windows process list are SearchUI.exe, the Search and Cortana application and ShellExperienceHost.exe, the Start menu and Desktop UI handler. As Windows apps, they are both spawned from the same Runtime Broker process as Edge. In this screenshot above, the SearchUI and ShellExperienceHost processes are in gray, indicative of suspended processes. Only one Windows app is in the foreground at a time, those that are out of focus are suspended and swapped out, with process data being compressed and written to the swapfile.sys in the file system[2].

Prepare for Internet connections to automatically be spawned by some of these new Win10 processes. OneDrive (formerly known as SkyDrive) has a connection to port 80 outbound and SearchUI (Cortana) creates outbound network connections as well when the user accesses the Start Menu. An example of network activity from the SearchUI process is shown below.

Figure 3. SearchUI.exe Network Connections

Figure 3. SearchUI.exe Network Connections

The memory data compression behavior first seen in Windows apps on Windows 8 has been implemented on a wider scale in Windows 10. Now when the memory manager detects “memory pressure”, meaning there is limited availability for data to be written to physical memory, data is compressed and written to the page file.[3] Why is this relevant to the forensic examiner? Analysis of page file data can yield fruit, uncovering trace artifacts that indicate the malware at one point resided on the system. Remember that the contents of the page file were once in physical memory. This data, though highly fragmented, is great for string searches and yara signature scans. With the implementation of Windows 10 memory compression, a new obstacle exists for such analysis.

If you have done investigations involving nefarious command line activity, it is useful to know that the cmd.exe process now spawns its own conhost.exe process as of Windows 8. This is notable because in previous Windows versions, conhost is spawned by the csrss.exe process. I am always leery of a command shell running on an endpoint, particularly one to which a web browser has a handle.

It is often difficult to discern what version of Windows 10 your target system was running at the time memory was acquired. Two significant updates have been pushed since Windows 10 initial release, Threshold 2 in November 2016 and the Anniversary edition in July 2015. Shown below is imageinfo plugin output from Rekall Memory Forensic Framework (1.5.3 Furka)3 detailing the Build Version. With so many different features added between Windows versions as well as significant changes rolled out in updates, having a tool that uses the publicly available Windows symbols, like Rekall, is key. When profiles have to be created in order to support new versions of Windows as seen in analysis tools, there is lag time. Rekall automatically detects the Windows version and uses the hosted profile from its repository by default.

alissa-torres-halloween-final-google-docs

Xbox runs on Windows 10 now and you may be among those celebrating that you can now stream console games to your computer.  But how does this affect our forensic findings? Expect to see Xbox gaming services present even if they are not being used. Since malware commonly instantiates new services or hijacks existing ones as a method of persistence, again, it is good to know what normal looks like.

alissa-torres-halloween-final-google-docs

Hopefully a recap on how things have changed in recent versions of Windows will speed your analysis as you work to unravel the story of what evil happened on a system. Happy hunting!

[1][2], [3], [3]

About the author:

Alissa Torres is a certified instructor with SANS and the co-author/instructor of FOR526: Memory Forensics In-Depth. Her industry experience includes serving in the trenches as part of the Mandiant Computer Incident Response Team (MCIRT) as an incident handler and working on an internal security team as a digital forensic investigator. She has extensive experience in information security, spanning government, academic, and corporate environments and holds a Bachelor’s degree from University of Virginia and a Master’s degree from University of Maryland in Information Technology. Alissa has taught as an instructor at the Defense Cyber Investigations Training Academy (DCITA), delivering incident response and network basics to security professionals entering the forensics community. She has presented at various industry conferences and numerous B-Sides events. In addition to being a GIAC Certified Forensic Analyst (GCFA), she holds the GCFE, GPEN, CISSP, EnCE, CFCE, MCT and CTT+.


Forensic Implications of iOS Lockdown (Pairing) Records

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by ElcomSoft

In recent versions of iOS, successful acquisition of a locked device is no longer a given. Multiple protection layers and Apple’s new policy on handling government requests make forensic experts look elsewhere when investigating Apple smartphones.

In this publication, we’ll discuss acquisition approach to an iOS device under these specific circumstances:

  1. Runs iOS 8.x through 10.x
  2. When seized, the device was powered on but locked with a passcode and/or Touch ID
  3. Device was never powered off or rebooted since it was seized
  4. Does not have a jailbreak installed and may not allow installing a jailbreak
  5. Investigators have access to one or more computers to which the iOS device was synced (iTunes) or trusted (by confirming the “Trust this PC” pop-up on the device) in the past

While this list may appear extensive and overly detailed, in real life it simply means an iPhone that was seized in a screen-locked state and stored properly in its current state (i.e. not allowed to power down or reboot). If this is the case, we might be able to access information in the device by using a so-called lockdown file, or pairing record. This record may be available on the suspect’s home or work PC that was either used to sync the iOS device with iTunes or simply used for charging if the suspect ever tapped “OK” on the “Trust this PC” pop-up.

About Pairing Relationships

In terms of iOS forensics, a pairing is a trusted relationship between the iOS device and a computer (Mac or PC). Once a pairing relationship is initially established (by unlocking the iOS device with Touch ID or passcode and confirming the “Trust this PC” prompt), the two devices exchange cryptographic keys, and the computer is granted trusted access to the iPhone even if the iPhone’s screen is locked.

Once established, pairing relationships are maintained through reboots. However, the iPhone must be unlocked with a passcode at least once after the reboot. Pairing relationships survive passcode changes; however, since iOS 8 all existing pairing relationships will be lost upon factory reset.

iOS 7 and older: Once established, a pairing relationship will never expire. In iOS 7 and older, established trust would survive through reboots and factory resets. Moreover, if the device is running iOS 7 or earlier, it can be unlocked with a pairing record immediately after it’s turned on (unlocking with passcode not required). This is why it was possible for Apple to extract information from locked iPhones sent in by the government. The company would use a pre-established trust relationship to produce a backup of the locked device. In iOS 8, all existing pairing relationships were invalidated; established trust does not survive through a factory reset, and accessing device data with a pairing record now requires a passcode unlock after a reboot.

About Lockdown Records (Pairing Records)

Lockdown records, or pairing records, are files that are stored on the computer to which the iOS device syncs to. These files are created the first time the user connects their iOS device to a PC that has iTunes installed. Lockdown records are used to re-establish a pairing relationship between the computer and iOS device, allowing the user to conveniently sync their iPhone by simply connecting it to their computer and without having to manually unlock the device every time.

Forensic specialists routinely use lockdown records to produce a full device backup of the connected phone. A lockdown file can be extracted from the original computer and used on a different Mac or PC to re-establish pairing relationship; all that without unlocking the iPhone with a passcode or Touch ID.

Do Lockdown Records Expire?

There is no definite information on the expiry of lockdown records. Since Apple has full control over iOS, it may introduce various expiration rules similar to Touch ID expiry. Officially, pairing relationships last until revoked.

“Trusted computers can sync with your iOS device, create backups, and access your device’s photos, videos, contacts, and other content. These computers remain trusted unless you change which computers you trust or erase your iOS device.” https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202778

It is possible for the user to revoke trusted relationship with any given PC by performing the following procedure:

“If you don’t want to trust a computer or other device anymore, change the privacy settings on your iPhone, iPad, or iPod touch: In iOS 8 or later, tap Settings > General > Reset > Reset Location & Privacy. Now when you connect to formerly trusted computers, the Trust alert will ask you whether you trust that computer.” https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202778

Pairing relationships established with devices running iOS 7 or earlier never expire and survive reboots and factory resets. Once such devices get updated to iOS 8 or newer, all existing trust relationships are revoked and must be re-established under new rules.

Since iOS 8, all pairing relationships remain unavailable after the device restarts or powers on until the device is unlocked (at least once) with a passcode.

The ultimate question, of course, is “how much time exactly do I have to use a lockdown record before it expires?” While there is no definite answer to this question, various publications refer to wildly different timeframes. We were able to check some of those claims.

Do lockdown records expire in 48 hours since last unlock?

No. We tested with multiple devices running all major versions of iOS since 8.1 all the way through 10.2 beta, and found that we were able to use lockdown records to obtain backups way past the 48 hours. In fact, we repeated the test (on iOS 10.1 only), this time waiting for 5 days since last unlock, and we were still able to obtain the backup by using a lockdown file.

Do lockdown records expire in 30, 60 or 90 days?

We cannot support this claim, but we can’t reject it either. A single oldest pairing record we have is nearly 4 months old, and it still can be used to produce a backup. However, this single pairing record comes from an iOS 8.1 device; we did not have old enough pairing records for our other devices. As Apple has full control over iOS, it can introduce various expiration rules at any time.

At this time, we believe it’s safe to assume that existing lockdown record would not expire based on their age alone. However, they may or may not be able to be used to unlock an iOS device if the device was passively stored for more than 30 days.

Acquisition of a Locked iPhone with a Lockdown Record

If you possess a turned on and locked iOS device and have no means of unlocking it with either Touch ID or passcode, you may still be able to obtain a backup via the process called logical acquisition. While logical acquisition may return somewhat less information compared to the more advanced physical acquisition, it must be noted that physical acquisition may not be available at all on a given device.

Important: Starting with iOS 8, obtaining a backup is only possible if the iOS device was unlocked with a passcode at least once after booting. For this reason, if you find an iPhone that is turned on, albeit locked, do not turn it off. Instead, isolate it from wireless networks by placing it into a Faraday bag, and do not allow it to power off or completely discharge by connecting it to a charger (a portable power pack inside a Faraday bag works great until you transfer the device to a lab). This will give you time to searching user’s computers for a lockdown record.

If you have a powered-on but locked iPhone, using a lockdown record to obtain a backup may be your only chance to perform acquisition. In most cases, this will be the only method that can extract keychain items.

Very important: You can obtain a backup of a locked device only if you possess a non-revoked pairing record, and the device has been unlocked at least once before the seizure. If the device has been turned off or rebooted at least once after the seizure, you will not be able to use the lockdown record unless you are able to unlock the device with a passcode. You’ve seen this warning before, maybe more than once. We’ll keep repeating it because it’s really, really important to keep the phone powered on all the time between the seizure and acquisition.

Password-Protected vs. Unencrypted Backups

Users of iOS devices have the ability to protect backups with a password. This option can be set in iTunes as they an offline backup. If a backup password is specified, you will not be able to change or remove that password without entering it first. In other words, you will need to break that password using Elcomsoft Phone Breaker (see below for a practical guide).

An important difference between password-protected iOS backups and backups that have no password is encryption. If the user specifies a backup password, the full content of the backup will be encrypted with that password.

If, on the other hand, there is no backup password specified, the backup will come out partially unencrypted. In this case, “partially unencrypted” means that some data (such as the keychain) will still come out encrypted. However, as opposed to password-protected backups, the keychain will be encrypted with a strong, hardware-dependent key that cannot be recovered or extracted from any 64-bit device equipped with Secure Enclave (iPhone 5s and newer models).

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Password-protected Password-protected No password
Password known? NO YES
Keychain decrypted? YES YES NO*
How to decrypt 1. Break password with Elcomsoft Phone Breaker
2. Use EPB to decrypt the backup
Use Elcomsoft Phone Breaker to decrypt the backup No action needed. * Must set known temporary password to access keychain.

If the user specified a backup password in iTunes, no unencrypted data ever leaves the phone. All encryption is performed by iOS inside the device (iPhone, iPad). iTunes acts as a simple receiver, pulling encrypted data stream from the device and saving it into files on your hard drive. There is no way to intercept plain data since there is none.

If you find a phone set up with an unknown backup password, produce a backup nevertheless. Use Elcomsoft Phone Breaker to recover the original password by running an attack.

Acquisition of iOS Devices Post Shut Down/Reboot

What happens if you find the device that is turned off, or if you attempt to acquire a device that was turned off or allowed to reboot before you started acquisition? In this case, even if you have a valid, non-revoked and unexpired lockdown record, you will not be able to use it to obtain a backup. Not before you unlock the device at least once, in which case you won’t need bothering with a lockdown file at all. In other words, you’ll need to know the passcode to obtain a backup.

Walkthrough: How to Use Lockdown Records to Obtain a Backup

In order to use lockdown records to make a backup of an iOS device, you will need all of the following:

  1. An iOS device that is powered on and that was unlocked with a passcode at least once after last reboot
  2. A lockdown file extracted from the user’s Mac or PC
  3. A copy of Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit (to obtain a backup using a lockdown file)
  4. A copy of Elcomsoft Phone Breaker (to decrypt backups; to break unknown backup password)

Extracting Lockdown Files

You must extract the correct lockdown record from the user’s computer in order to use it with Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit for logical acquisition. Lockdown records are stored at the following locations:

Windows Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, Windows 10: %ProgramData%\Apple\Lockdown

(Sample path: C:\ProgramData\Apple\Lockdown\6f3a363e89aaf8e8bd293ee839485730344edba1.plist)

Windows XP: %AllUsersProfile%\Application Data\Apple\Lockdown

(Sample path: C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Apple\Lockdown\6f3a363e89aaf8e8bd293ee839485730344edba1.plist)

macOS: /var/db/lockdown

Note: On systems running macOS Sierra, administrative privileges are required to extract lockdown files. Use “sudo cp (source path)/lockdown/{id}.plist (destination path)” when extracting lockdown files from live systems (password required). Alternatively, lockdown files may be extracted from a forensic disk image.

In these folders, you may see multiple .plist files. Their names correspond to UUID identifiers or iOS devices that were paired with the computer. Discovering the UUID of the device being investigated is as easy as using the “I” command in Elcomsoft iOS forensic Toolkit and analyzing the resulting XML document:

<?xml version=”1.0″ encoding=”UTF-8″?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC “-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN” “http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd”&gt;
<plist version=”1.0″>
<dict>
<…>
<key>UniqueDeviceID</key>
<string>0a226c3b263e004a76e6199c43c4072ca7c64a59</string>
</dict>
</plist>

Tip: You may want to copy these files to a new folder on your computer, and give them shorter names for easier reference. Since Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit is a tool based on the command line, you’ll have to type these names when using them with the product.

More information about lockdown files and their location is available at https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203887

Obtaining a Backup

In order to obtain a backup, do the following.

  1. Launch Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit by using the “Toolkit-JB” command. Make sure the license protection dongle is attached to a USB port.
  2. Connect iOS device being extracted to another USB port.
  3. In Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit, select option “B – Create iTunes-style backup of the device”. If this option does not appear in the main menu, make sure you are using iOS Forensic Toolkit 2.1 or newer, and that you are using the “Toolkit-JB” command as opposed to the legacy “Toolkit”.

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Note that iOS Forensic Toolkit does not require Apple iTunes to be installed on the computer in order to perform the backup.
4. When prompted, enter path to lockdown record you extracted. Giving lockdown files shorter names makes this step easier.
5. If a lockdown record is not accepted, try other lockdown files corresponding to the same UUID if available (e.g. extracted from other computers).
6. If an iOS device being acquired is configured to produce backups without a password, iOS Forensic Toolkit will automatically set a known backup password prior to acquisition. The temporary password is “123”. If this is the case, skip directly to “Viewing and analyzing backups”.
7. If the backup password is set by the user and you don’t know it, obtain a backup nevertheless. You will have to perform an attack (brute-force, dictionary, or combination) with Elcomsoft Phone Breaker in order to recover the password.

Recovering Unknown Backup Password

If the user specified an unknown backup password, you will have to break it before you can access information stored in the backup. For breaking the password, you’ll be using a Windows version of Elcomsoft Phone Breaker. At this time, only a Windows edition of Elcomsoft Phone Breaker supports GPU-accelerated password recovery.

As with most password recovery efforts, the possibility of successful recovery as well as the time required to finish the job will depend on multiple parameters such as the length and complexity of the password, software and hardware used to recover it, and the type of attack (dictionary of common words, custom dictionary, or brute-force). There is no fixed timeframe and no guarantee for breaking backup passwords.

As a rough estimate, a PC equipped with a single NVIDIA GTX 1080 board can try about 100,000 password combinations per second (a rough estimate close enough to real-world performance), which means a password that consists of 6 digits can be broken in under 10 seconds. If a password only contains numbers, the use of each additional character makes the password 10 times stronger, which means that breaking the password takes 10 times longer with every additional number. A password that consists entirely of small Latin characters gets 26 times stronger with each extra letter. If the password contains numbers and both small and capital letters, it gets 62 times stronger with every additional character. A 6-character password composed of small letters and digits has over 2 billion possible combinations, and will take about 6 hours to brute-force.

Elcomsoft Phone Breaker is one of the more advanced tools on the market for breaking iOS backup passwords. It can employ your computer’s GPU units, using your video card to break passwords 20 to 80 times faster compared to a CPU alone.

Elcomsoft Phone Breaker attempts to recover the password by running an offline attack on the backup file. One or more different attacks such as dictionary or brute-force can be specified. A combination of attacks makes up a recovery pipeline.

Hint: Many users think alike. They commonly re-use passwords, or use the same pattern to compose their passwords. Analyzing their computer for existing passwords may reveal such a pattern, allowing you to build a rule to greatly limit the number of possible password combinations to try.

Top 10,000 passwords: According to our research, up to 30% of all passwords can be broken with a dictionary containing the 10,000 most popular passwords. Such dictionaries can be easily found online, e.g. at https://xa.to/top10k. Obtaining this dictionary and using it with Elcomsoft Phone Breaker gives a chance of breaking a complex password almost instantly. Another list containing top 10 million passwords is also available (https://xa.to/10m). However, the rule of diminishing returns applies here: we found that only about 33% of real-world passwords can be successfully broken by using that list. We highly recommend using the Top 10,000 Passwords list for all password recovery cases.

To recover the password in Elcomsoft Phone Breaker, do the following:

  1. Launch Elcomsoft Phone Breaker and open the Password Recovery Wizard.

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2. In Password Recovery Wizard, click “Choose source” or drag-and-drop the backup’s Manifest.plist file onto the window.

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3. If you are analyzing a live system, the tool will list all backups available to current Windows user.

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4. If you are analyzing a mounted disk image, you may specify path to backup files by using the “Choose another” command.

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If you are specifying the location manually, note the default paths used by iTunes on the different operating systems:

  • Windows XP:
    \Documents and Settings\(username)\Application Data\Apple Computer\MobileSync\Backup\
  • Windows Vista, 7 and 8:
    \Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Apple Computer\MobileSync\Backup\
  • Mac OS X (all versions):
    ~/Library/Application Support/MobileSync/Backup/

5. After selecting the backup file, set up the recovery pipeline by specifying attacks that will be used to break the password.

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Click on the plus “+” sign to add various attacks for breaking the password. You may drag and drop the attacks to specify the order of their execution. By default, Dictionary and Brute Force attacks are automatically added. (Reminder: using a custom dictionary and/or the Top 10,000 Passwords list may significantly increase the chance of successful recovery).

6. You can optionally configure both the Dictionary Attack and Brute-Force by clicking on the gear icon to the right of each method.

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Limiting the brute-force attack to a reasonable number of characters and/or a certain character set will speed up the attack, but will not try some password combinations.

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7. Once the recovery pipeline is configured, click Start recovery. Elcomsoft Phone Breaker will start attacking the password. Estimated time left as well as the currently processed word will be displayed. You can click More Info next to the name of the attack to see additional information such as the number of attempted passwords and the average attack speed.

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8. If the attack is successful, the discovered password will be displayed in the Recovery results window.

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Once the password is successfully recovered, it can be used to decrypt the backup including the keychain. If you are using Elcomsoft Phone Viewer, decrypting the backup is optional. However, if a mobile forensic tool of your choice does not support encrypted backups, you will have to perform an extra step to decrypt the backup using the newly recovered password.

In order to decrypt the backup, use the “Decrypt backup with known password” command from Elcomsoft Phone Breaker’s main window:

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Select the backup to decrypt, then specify output path and password:

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The Restore original file names option will decrypt the backup while attempting to keep file names to match the way they appear on the device. This option is useful if you are going to perform manual examination. Note, however, that most forensic tools require the backup to be in the standard iTunes format. If you are using one of such tools, we recommend keeping the “Restore original file names” option off.

Once the backup is decrypted, you may open it with a forensic tool of your choice.

Note: If using Elcomsoft Phone Viewer, decrypting the backup is not necessary as the tool supports encrypted files directly.

Viewing and Analyzing iPhone Backups

Multiple forensic tools exist allowing to view and analyze mobile backups. ElcomSoft released a lightweight forensic viewer, Elcomsoft Phone Viewer, to enable quick loading and viewing of mobile backups.

To view an iOS backup in Elcomsoft Phone Viewer, use the “iTunes backup” command or simply drag and drop the Manifest.plist file onto the tool’s main window.

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If you are working on a live system, you’ll be presented a list of available backups:

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Elcomsoft Phone Viewer directly supports encrypted backups. You will need to specify the password in order to open encrypted files.

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The backup will be decrypted and saved into a temporary folder.

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Once the backup is decrypted, you’ll see a device information window. From that window, you’ll be able to navigate to view contacts, calls, media, calendar events, browsing history etc.

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Conclusion

It may be possible to perform acquisition of iOS devices found locked but powered-on. Lockdown files may exist on the user’s Mac or PC. Those files can be used to obtain backup from an iOS device provided that the device was never allowed to power off or reboot after the seizure. Following established guidelines on seizing and storing mobile devices is a must for successful acquisition.

Tools and References

This article references multiple KB articles, whitepapers, and tools.

Tools:

References:



New Federal Rule of Evidence to Directly Impact Computer Forensics and eDiscovery Preservation Best Practices

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by John Patzakis, X1

unnamedA key amendment to US Federal Rule of Evidence 902, in the form of new subsection (14), will go into effect on December 1, 2017. This amendment will significantly impact eDiscovery and computer forensics software and its use by establishing that electronic data recovered “by a process of digital identification” is to be self-authenticating, thereby not routinely necessitating the trial testimony of a forensic or technical expert where best practices are employed, as certified through a written affidavit by a “qualified person.” Notably, the accompanying official Advisory Committee notes specifically reference the importance of both generating “hash values” and verifying them post-collection as a means to meet this standard for self-authentication. This digital identification and verification process can only be achieved with purpose-built computer forensics or eDiscovery collection and preservation tools.

While Rule 902(14) will technically become effective on December 1, 2017, there is a “retroactive” aspect to this amendment, as electronic evidence collected in a Rule 902(14) compliant manner any time prior to the rule’s effective date can be admitted under the new provisions. This is important, because digital evidence is routinely collected well in advance of trial. Electronic evidence that an examiner collects next week may not be actually introduced at trial until one year or more from now, so practitioners need to understand and account for Rule 902(14) immediately.
Rule 902, in its current form, enumerates a variety of documents that are presumed to be self-authenticating without other evidence of authenticity. These include public records and other government documents, notarized documents, newspapers and periodicals, and records kept in the ordinary course of business. New subpart (14) will now include electronic data collected via a process of digital identification as a key addition to this important rule.

Amended Rule 902, in pertinent part, reads as follows:

Rule 902. Evidence That Is Self-Authenticating
The following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require no extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted:
* * *
(14) Certified Data Copied from an Electronic Device, Storage Medium, or File.
Data copied from an electronic device, storage medium, or file, if authenticated by a process of digital identification, as shown by a certification of a qualified person that complies with the certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12).
The reference to the “certification requirements of Rule 902(11) or (12)” is a process by which a proponent seeking to introduce electronic data into evidence must present a certification in the form of a written affidavit that would be sufficient to establish authenticity were that information provided by a witness at trial. This affidavit must be provided by a “qualified person,” which generally would be a computer forensics, eDiscovery or information technology practitioner, who collected the evidence and can attest to the requisite process of digital identification utilized.

In applying Rule 902(14), the courts will heavily rely on the accompanying Judicial Conference Advisory Committee notes, which provide guidance and insight concerning the intent of the laws and how they should be applied. The Advisory Committee notes are published alongside the statute and are essentially considered an extension of the rule. The second paragraph of committee note to Rule 902(14) states, in its entirety, as follows:

“Today, data copied from electronic devices, storage media, and electronic files are ordinarily authenticated by ‘hash value.’ A hash value is a number that is often represented as a sequence of characters and is produced by an algorithm based upon the digital contents of a drive, medium, or file. If the hash values for the original and copy are different, then the copy is not identical to the original. If the hash values for the original and copy are the same, it is highly improbable that the original and copy are not identical. Thus, identical hash values for the original and copy reliably attest to the fact that they are exact duplicates. This amendment allows self-authentication by a certification of a qualified person that she checked the hash value of the proffered item and that it was identical to the original. The rule is flexible enough to allow certifications through processes other than comparison of hash value, including by other reliable means of identification provided by future technology.”

The Advisory Committee notes further state that Rule 902(14) is designed to streamline the admission of electronic evidence where its foundation is not at issue, while providing a notice procedure where “the parties can determine in advance of trial whether a real challenge to authenticity will be made, and can then plan accordingly.” While this rule provides that properly certified electronic data is now afforded a strong presumption of authenticity, the opponent may still lodge an objection, but the opponent now has the burden to overcome that presumption. Additionally, the opponent remains free to object to admissibility on other grounds, such as relevance or hearsay.

Significant Impact Expected

While Rule 902(14) applies to the Federal Courts, the Rules of Evidence for most states either mirror or closely resemble the Federal Rules of Evidence, and it is thus expected that most if not all 50 states will soon adapt this amendment.

Rule 902(14) will most certainly and significantly impact computer forensics and eDiscovery practitioners by reinforcing best practices. The written certification required by Rule 902(14) must be provided by a “qualified person” who utilized best practices for the collection, preservation and verification of the digital evidence sought to be admitted. At the same time, this rule will in effect call into question electronic evidence collection methods that do not enable a defensible “digital identification” and verification process. In fact, the Advisory Committee notes specifically reference the importance of computer forensics experts, noting that a “challenge to the authenticity of electronic evidence may require technical information about the system or process at issue, including possibly retaining a forensic technical expert.”

In the eDiscovery context, I have previously highlighted the perils of both custodian self-collection for enterprise ESI collection and “print screen” methods for social media and website preservation. Rule 902(14) should provide the final nail in the coffin for those practices. For instance, if key social media evidence is collected through manual print screen, which is not a “process of digital identification” under Rule 902(14), then not only will the proponent of that evidence fail to take advantage of the efficiencies and cost-savings provided by the rule, they will also invite heightened scrutiny for not preserving the evidence utilizing best practices. The same is true for custodian self-collection in the enterprise. Many emails and other electronic documents preserved and disclosed by the producing party are often favorable to their case. Without best practices utilized for enterprise data collection, that information may not be deemed self-authenticating under this new rule.

In the law enforcement field, untrained patrol officers or field investigators are too often collecting electronic evidence in a manual and haphazard fashion, without utilizing the right tools that qualify as a “process of digital identification.” So for an example, if an untrained investigator collects a web page via the computer’s print screen process, that printout will not be deemed to be self-authenticating under Rule 902(14), and will face significant evidentiary hurdles compared to a properly collected web page via a solution that is Rule 902(14) compliant.

Also being added to Federal Rule of Evidence 902 is subpart (13), which provides that “a record generated by an electronic process or system that produces an accurate result” is similarly self-authenticating. This subpart will also have a beneficial impact on the computer forensics and eDiscovery field, but to a lesser degree than subpart (14). Look for a further discussion of Rule 902(13) in a future article. The public comment period on amendments (13) and (14) is now closed and the Judicial Conference of the United States has issued its final approval. The amendments are currently under review by the US Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court approves these amendments as expected, they will become effective on December 1, 2017 absent Congressional intervention.


John Patzakis is an attorney and Executive Chairman of X1. Mr. Patzakis is widely published over the past 15 years and has lectured frequently on matters concerning digital evidence and the law. X1 (www.x1.com) offers next generation search, investigation and eDiscovery software including X1 Social Discovery, the leading social media and internet investigation solution, and X1 Distributed Discovery, a revolutionary enterprise eDiscovery search and collection platform.


Digital Forensic Investigational Tool For Volatile Browser Based Data Analysis in Windows 8 OS

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by W.Chirath De Alwis, School of Computing, Asia Pacific Institute of Information Technology, Colombo, Sri Lanka

Abstract

Cyber security threats on sensitive resources have increased recently and it has increased the need for digital forensic analysis tools. Digital evidence can be extracted not only from hard drives but also from other memory resources of a computing device. Analyzing volatile memory is becoming popular due to increases in memory capacity. This research presents the importance of volatile memory analysis and identifies the limitations of conventional forensic methods. It also identifies the browser based information that is stored in the volatile memory and how this evidence can be retrieved for investigational purposes.

I. INTRODUCTION

At present, digital forensics is more focused on extracting evidence from non-volatile memory resources [1]. But volatile memory contains some crucial evidence that cannot be found in any other memory sources. Current findings identify that malware writers are keen to reduce their footprint on the victim’s hard disk, Instead they use the victim’s volatile memory to carry out their tasks [2]. The SQL Slammer worm is a great example of malware which exists only in volatile memory [3].

Browser based information gets stored in both volatile and nonvolatile memory. When users utilize private browsing mode, the computer does not store information about the user’s activities on the hard disk.

Information related to visited pages, forms, search bar history, passwords, download history, cookies, cached web content and offline web content are not stored in non-volatile storage media if private browsing has been enabled [4]. This has enabled malicious intruders to evade trace of their activities by disabling the logs maintained by the operating systems. Since volatile memory also stores these data, in order to investigate such cases volatile memory analysis becomes vital.

Even though acquiring memory image is not a complex task for forensic investigators, analyzing and extracting data out of the raw memory image is becoming a complicated task for them. Unless an application encrypts the data stored in memory, mostly data are stored by applications in plain text format. These application data have their own universal storage format. RAM will store the data temporally in its registers until allocated memory gets overwritten.

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During this period, if the image of the memory can be acquired, these application data can be retrieved. But the limitation is that since RAM is volatile memory it has a high possibility of being overwritten by some other data in a very short period of time. After numerous studies, an approach of extracting evidence stored by browser in volatile memory has been developed.

“Keyword search”, also known as a “string search” has been used by forensic investigators to identify evidence based on known keywords [5].

In order to aid the investigators in this process, suggested methodology also has incorporated with other methodologies which will extract necessary information.

File carving is another methodology which is valuable in volatile memory analysis and it enables the investigator to extract files from the raw memory image. File carving techniques usually deal with the raw data stored in the memory and it doesn’t require considering the file system architecture during the process. Most of the forensic analysis tools do not contain features which will enable the forensic investigator to perform file carving on volatile memory.

Apart from these analysis techniques, analyzing memorymapped files is also used to extract data from volatile memory. Typically, many different types of data structures are used to describe file object.

These structures can be found by looking at process data structures and finding mapped files with that process [2].

Object table is one of the structures in the VAD tree and it can list private objects that are in use by a process [2]. These can be files, registry keys, and events. Therefore these memorymapped files contain many valuable data that may useful in investigating computer crimes and those data can be extracted from analyzing different data structures.

II. RELATED WORK

There are several volatile memory analysis tools which have been developed in the recent past. Volatility, Redline, Memoryze, FATKit, WMFT, VAD tools, EnCase, Rekall, Internet Evidence Finder (IEF) and FTK are the most popular volatile memory analysis tools.

Since most of the available tools are more focused on processes and threads, extracting web browsing artifacts has become limited. The capability of extracting email and social media artifacts has been limited in existing tools.

Even though Volatility has plugins for usernames and passwords, search forms [10], dump files [11], Facebook and Twitter artifacts [12], Volatility does not support the extraction of other social networking artifacts.

When comparing the existing tools it is evident that extracting web URLs is a common feature on both commercial and open source tools but only limited number of tools supports the string search and file carving functionalities.

Even though Internet Evidence Finder (IEF) supports multiple social networking artifacts the extraction of Facebook artifacts is limited in this tool. Extraction of Google search, YouTube titles, file carving and string search are also not available in this IEF tool.

III. TARGETED EVIDENCE RETRIEVAL

In order to simplify recovery of appropriate evidence, a classification was devised with five distinct categories: social networking, video streaming (YouTube), web history, email communication and VoIP (Skype). String search and file carving methodologies are also integrated as part of the proposed tool.

A. Social Networking

Social networking includes evidences that are related to most commonly used social networking sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter and Google search. Table (I) illustrates the evidence that can be retrieved which are related to the above mentioned social networking sites.

TABLE I. DETAILED LIST OF SOCIAL NETWORKING ARTIFACTS

 

Social Network Artifacts
Facebook Login credentials, Security code,
Messages, Observed images,
Observed profiles, Provided
Comments, Friends information,
Notifications, incorporated third
party apps, Hash tags, Status
updates, Location status,
Groups and Life events
LinkedIn Login credentials, Security code
Twitter Login credentials
Google Google search titles

B. Video Streaming (YouTube)

Video streaming evidence will provide titles of videos that user have searched on YouTube.

C. Web History

Web history information will include Domain names, visited URLs, Visited PDF links, downloaded or opened JPEG images.

D. Email Communications

Email communications information will include evidence related to Gmail, Yahoo and Hotmail service providers. The table below shows the detailed list of evidence that can be retrieved.

TABLE II. DETAILED LIST OF EMAIL COMMUNICATION ARTIFACTS

Email Artifacts
Gmail Login credentials, Contacts,
Emails, Security code
Hotmail Login credentials, Emails
Yahoo mail Login credentials, Emails

E. VoIP (Skype)

Information related to the most commonly used VoIP application, Skype, also can be retrieved. This information will contain the usernames used in the system to access the service provided.

IV. FRAMEWORK DESIGN

The framework includes two different components which can be used to extract evidence from volatile memory.

A. Extracting artifiacts based on Pattern Matching

The process of extracting artifacts based on pattern matching has three main phases.

In the initial stage, the investigator has to identify the unique pattern used by the applications to store data in the device. Various patterns are used by different browsers and operating systems.

In order to identify the exact pattern of data storage, multiple tests must be conducted. An example of a pattern identification is shown below.

Eg: Facebook stores their security code under “&approvals_code=”.

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Whenever a user enters the six digit Facebook security code, it writes to the volatile memory under “&approvals_code=” string. Therefore “&approvals_code=” can be identified as the pattern that stores the Facebook security code.

In the second stage, evidence which have been identified using provided pattern has to be recovered from the volatile memory image. The regular expression in JAVA programming language is a great method to extract these data from the memory image. To extract the evidence by using regular expression, it requires a text file with the ASCII content of the memory image.

Eg:

The regular expression used to extract Facebook security
code:
\\&approvals\\_code\\=\\w{6}

Finally, it is required to filter the regular expression output to display the relevant content.

Eg:

Regular expression result before filter:
&approvals_code=123456

Regular expression result after filter:
Facebook Security code is: 123456

B. File Carving based on Header-Footer

File headers and footers; refer to specific patterns of values that are unique to the type of files [6]. These header and footer values can be used to identify the file within the memory image.

The content of the file is stored in between these header and footer values. The aim of this method is to identify the memory location where the file is stored at. Then the footer value is used to identify the memory size and the address location where the file is stored.

Eg:

Header value of a JPG file: FF D8 FF E0
Footer value of a JPG file: FF D9

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4

5

Since images using JPG compression was the targeted artifact, the methodology of carving .jpg files is elaborated below.

Once the memory image is acquired then the header and footer values of the file should be identified. After successful identification of the header and footer values or the corresponding offset values then the next step is to extract the ASCII content in between these header and footer values. The final step is to save the content as a new file with the extension of “.jpg”.

The same methodology can be used to carve any file format by converting the header-footer values and saving the new file with the relevant file extension. This method allows the investigator to carve multiple files with a minimum time. Since memory image may contain multiple files, it is possible to find the same header and footer value in multiple locations on the memory image.

The file is not overwritten; fragmented, compressed or encrypted are the assumptions that should be made when carving files from volatile memory image [7].

V. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

WinHex and HxD have been used as the primary tools to analyze the results. WinHex and HxD are hexadecimal editors capable of viewing the volatile memory image content. Testing is done on both Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome browsers. The results of each and every function of the implementation were then tested manually with the use of above mentioned hexadecimal editors.

The accuracy of the identified patterns was tested comparing both expected and actual outputs. The same test was performed multiple times against multiple memory images. This was performed manually using the above mentioned hexadecimal editors.

After numerous tests, it is evident that the implementation of the methodology of the data extraction based on pattern matching which used to extract artifacts described under “Section III” has an accuracy of 90%. Implementation of the “Web History” was not 100% accurate and it had some false positives.

Apart from “Web History”, this pattern based data extraction method was able to retrieve expected outputs for each and every artifact described under “Section III”.

Proper test cases for each and every pattern were identified and the implemented function was designed to test the outputs. To verify the accuracy of this method and results, these tests were conducted multiple times and the results were compared.

Implementation of the string search was performed well but it requires some modifications. Implemented string search was able to find the searched strings with an accuracy of 90%.

Even though the implementation of the file carving was not completed, the method described under “Section IV” was tested manually using the above mentioned hex editors. The accuracy of the file carving methodology was 100%. Accuracy was identified by manually carving files from the memory image. This method has an accuracy of 100% because it was able to carve viewable .jpg files from the memory image.

After numerous tests on both .raw and .dmp memory image formats, it was evident that this developed application supports both .raw and .dmp memory image formats.

Integrity of the evidence is one of the most important components in digital forensics investigations. To ensure the integrity of the memory file after the analysis, hash values (SHA-1 and MD5) were taken on the memory image before and after the analysis. Comparing these hash values evident that the original hash value of the memory image was not changed after the analysis. It can conclude that this application does not affect the hash value when it is being analyzed.

VI. CONCLUSION

The analysis of digital evidence is facing several key challenges. Memory forensic techniques have the potential to overcome these issues [1]. But, most of the research carried out focuses on processes and threads.

But, apart from these data, memory holds various other data which has forensic value when investigating crimes.

Since malware writers began reducing their footprint in victims’ hard drives, it is difficult to trace activities performed by these malware from analyzing hard drives. Therefore an improvement on traditional forensic methodologies has become essential when investigating crimes.

Features such as “Private browsing” do not save browsing information when enabled. So users can take the benefit of such features to reduce their footprint. Therefore investigating such crimes are difficult with traditional disk forensics methodologies. Even though these features do not store browsing information on the client’s hard disk, this information can be found in the volatile memory. So there is a possibility of extracting these artifacts from the volatile memory.

Unless an application encrypts its data, data used by the applications are in plaintext format. During an application process, these data are temporary stored in the RAM. Since most of the plaintext data available in the volatile memory belongs to applications, these available plaintext data may contain valuable information. After numerous tests, an approach of extracting artifacts based on available plaintext data in the volatile memory has been developed. This approach was able to address a different area, which other available software solutions couldn’t address. With this approach, it was able to extract forensic artifacts based on five main categories such as social networking, email communication, web history, VoIP and video streaming.

After the identification of some common problems in the available software based memory analysis tools, an integrated solution has been implemented as a proof-of concept of the extracting artifacts based on pattern matching method.

Apart from these data, the application has an integrated string search methodology where the user can search for any known string against the memory image. “File Carving” is a technique that is used to carve files from a memory file.

Even though this header-footer based file carving is an existing methodology, the advantage of this method was limited to non-volatile memory. Most of the available tools do not support file carving from volatile memory.

After numerous tests it was evident that this header-footer based file carving methodology can possibly be used against the volatile memory to carve files. As a result of that, this file carving methodology was also integrated in this application. This integrated file carving methodology was designed to carve JPG files from the memory image.

This developed application is capable of extracting 36 types of data from the volatile memory which is a comprehensive development in the field of memory forensics. It is an accurate solution that can address many different problems in the field of memory forensics.

After numerous tests it was evident that this developed application is capable of extracting artifacts even when the user enables the “private browsing” feature on his/her browser. As in the “section V” this application was able to extract artifacts from both .raw and .dmp memory image formats that allow investigators to use multiple memory image formats. This developed application does not affect the original hash value of the memory image after the analysis. It ensures the integrity of the memory image.

As with every other volatile memory forensics tool, the volatility of the data in the RAM is a challenge in this developed application. If data stored in the RAM were not overwritten, it is possible to extract these addressed data from the memory image.

VII. FUTURE ENHANCEMENT

In the future, this application can be enhanced to more advanced application by integrating other existing methods with more efficiency and accuracy.

Since file carving focuses more on the JPG file type, this application can be enhanced to extract other file types as well. Command line details [8] and encryption keys [9] are some other possible data that can be extracted from volatile memory. Extracting such data can also be integrated into this application.

Since the extraction of data from Twitter, LinkedIn and Skype is limited in this application, it is also possible to improve the extraction of data related to these social media.

Since memory acquisition is out of the scope of this project, memory acquisition can also integrate into this application. From a forensic perspective, it is also important to have perfect research methods when selecting the acquisition tool, because running an application in a computer can overwrite the data available in the volatile memory.

REFERENCES

[1] Simon, M. Slay, J. (2009). Enhancement of Forensic Computing Investigations through Memory Forensic Techniques. [Online]. P 995. Available from: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5066600 [Accessed 04/06/2014].

[2] Amari, K. (2009). Techniques and Tools for Recovering and Analyzing Data from Volatile Memory. [Online]. P 10-25. Available from: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/techniquestools-recovering-analyzing-data-volatile-memory-33049 [Accessed 01/06/2014].

[3] Moore, D. et al (2003). Inside the Slammer Worm. [Online]. P 33. Available from: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=1219056 [Accessed 4/07/2014].

[4] Mozilla. 2014. Private Browsing – Browse the web without saving information about the sites you visit. [ONLINE] Available at: https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/private-browsing-browse-webwithout-saving-info?redirectlocale=enUS&as=u&redirectslug=Private+Browsing&utm_source=inproduct#what-does-private-browsing-not-save [Accessed 06/10/2014].

[5] Amari, K. (2009). Techniques and Tools for Recovering and Analyzing Data from Volatile Memory. [Online]. P 10-25. Available from: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/techniquestools-recovering-analyzing-data-volatile-memory-33049 [Accessed 01/06/2014].

[6] Shaw, R. 2013. File Carving. [ONLINE] Available at: http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/file-carving/ [Accessed: 11/9/2014].

[7] Merola. A. (2008). Data Carving Consepts. [Online]. Available from: http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/data-carvingconcepts-32969 [Accessed: 11/09/2014].

[8] Stevens, R,M. Casey, E. (2010). Extracting Windows command line details from physical memory. [Online]. P 1. Available from: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1742287610000356 [Accessed 01/06/2014].

[9] Hargreaves, C. Chivers, H. (2008). Recovery of Encryption Keys from Memory Using a Linear Scan. [Online]. P 1369. Available from: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4529504&queryText%3Dwindows+memory+analysis [Accessed 4/07/2014].

[10] Ligh , M.H.(2014) Announcing the 2014 Volatility Plugin Contest Results! [Online] October 29th 2014. Available from: http://volatilitylabs.blogspot.com/2014/10/announcing-2014-volatility-plugin.html [Accessed: 11/12/2014].

[11] Volatility Foundation. 2014. Command Reference. [ONLINE] Available at: https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility/wiki/Command%20Reference#dumpfiles [Accessed 11/12/2014].

[12] Volatility Foundation.(2013) Results are in for the 1st Annual Volatility Framework Plugin Contest! Available from: http://volatilitylabs.blogspot.com/2013/08/results-are-in-for-1st-annual.html [Accessed: 11/12/2014].

About the Author

chirath-de-alwis-google-docsI am Chirath De Alwis. An information security professional with more than two years’ experience in Information Security domain. I am armed with C|EH, C|HFI and Qualys Certified Security Specialist certifications. Currently involved in vulnerability management, incident handling and digital forensics activities in Sri Lankan cyberspace. You can contact me on chirathdealwis@gmail.com.


Windows 10 PE for Digital Forensics

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by Robin Brocks, IT Forensic Expert and Incident Responder

Only a few years ago, it was a real pain creating a portable Windows on CD/ DVD or thumb drive, because the Operating System was not prepared to run on those media. There have been numerous projects and volunteers, like BartPE or the WindowsFE (Forensic Edition), to make it possible to run a complete OS from removable media, but in every case, this takes time and a lot of customizing.

Nowadays we do not only have Microsoft selling “Windows to Go”; it is easier than ever to create an own version of a portable Windows, together with everyone`s favorite tools, script or frameworks like Java or Python! Having a portable Windows 10 at your hand has some valuable advantages:

  • Booting a Windows OS with a huge integrated database of device drivers gives you instant access to all common consumer hardware
  • Forensically sound read-only access and read-write operations are possible
  • Access to all hard drives with NTFS (and FAT of course) file systems, even if they are protected by Bitlocker encryption
  • Integration of your preferred tools and scripts is very easy, you only have to copy them
  • Widely used software like FTK Imager, OSForeniscs, X-Ways Forensics and a lot of others all run smoothly inside Windows PE

Using your own Windows 10 PE version, customized with your favorite tools and scripts, gives you instant access to any filesystem on the device on which you are booting up your removable media. I do not recommend using such a Windows PE as your primary Digital Forensics toolset. It is not a replacement for a dedicated Forensic Workstation in your Lab or the expense for a physical Writeblocker. The great advantage of Windows PE on a USB thumb drive is speed! If you need urgent access to drives and files without tampering with any file stamps, such a toolset is for you. The most useful steps you can accomplish with Windows 10 PE are file carving, file extraction, malware analysis and investigation of all file-based artifacts.

Installation and Customization

First, I will describe which software from Microsoft you need to create your own Windows 10 PE media, how to install it and configure it for digital forensic purposes. Once everything is prepared, it’s child’s play to add your personal selection of applications and scripts for digital investigations.

Assuming you are running Windows 10, you must download the suitable version of the  “Windows Assessment and Deployment Kit” from here.

On this website, you will find versions for Windows 10 with build numbers 1511 and 1607, so make sure you pick the right one. Download the “Windows ADK for Windows 10” setup file with the name adksetup.exe

The corresponding MD5 hash values are:

Version 1511: 760e0dcc3440756ebe1657dc43ca6ef1
Version 1607: 3da6239a8d2039cb8eec7c831b9c664a

Run the setup file with administrative permissions. When it comes to the selection of the program features, you should select at least the options shown in the following screenshot. The setup program installs Windows PE in 32-bit and 64-bit flavor. Leave all other options as their default values, especially the suggested file paths.

Figure 1: Choose those two features for Windows 10 PE

Figure 1: Choose those two features for Windows 10 PE

During this article, we will create a Windows 10 PE media in 64 bit. You can start the Deployment console from the menu entry Start – Windows Kits – Deployment and Imaging Tools Environment with a right-click on Run as Administrator. This is a shortcut to a batch file in the programs folder, which sets several important variables and opens a command prompt. We will use this command prompt until all tasks are accomplished; it stays open all the time.

First we create a folder for the necessary files and copy them all in one step with:

copype amd64 C:\WinPE_amd64

followed by the matching command to mount the boot.wim file

Dism /Mount-Image /ImageFile:”C:\WinPE_amd64\media\sources\boot.wim” /index:1 /MountDir:”C:\WinPE_amd64\mount”

Figure 2: Dism@Work

Figure 2: Dism@Work

Your next step is to decide if you want your Windows 10 Preinstallation Environment to mount other drives than your boot drive in read/write mode or not. Just set the appropriate number as the last digit. 1 means “mount all drives writeable”, 2 means “mount all except those drives on a shared bus”, 3 stands for “do not mount anything in read/write mode” and 4 means “set internal disks offline”. We proceed with number 3 since we are doing digital forensics and do not let Windows decide which drive to mount as writable automatically.

The built-in tool diskpart.exe allows changing this behavior once Windows 10 PE is running; we will come to this topic later. Now we copy to the console window

Setsanpolicy C:\winpe_amd64\mount 3

Now it is time to add useful packages to the media. I have selected a subset of suitable packages for digital forensics and created a file with simple command strings to add them all to the PE media. These command strings add the mentioned packages in the right order and meet all dependencies. To keep this text short and readable, I have copied these command strings to Pastebin at http://pastebin.com/4JYijWyZ.

You can copy the entire text from the Pastebin and paste it to the command shell. The Windows program Dism.exe (Deployment Image Servicing and Management tool) installs all packages one after another as a batch job!

Adding these packages and the corresponding language packs takes 5- 10 minutes and when this is done, we have integrated support for:

  • WMI and WMIC
  • .NET 4.5 Framework
  • Powershell, the Windows Scripting Host and HTA applications
  • Access to Bitlocker encrypted drives (if you have the password, of course)

Language Support

At the moment, we have a Windows 10 PE in US English language and very soon the OS starts running with a US keyboard layout. For any other language support, please have a look at:

C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\Assessment and Deployment Kit\Windows Preinstallation Environment\amd64\WinPE_OCs

It contains subfolders named after the matching language and country. You can add a lot more language packages by adjusting the path to the *.cab file and Dism.exe to install them. French language support for Powershell? Not a problem!

Dism /Add-Package /Image:”C:\WinPE_amd64\mount” /PackagePath:”C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\Assessment and Deployment Kit\Windows Preinstallation Environment\amd64\WinPE_OCs\fr-fr\WinPE-PowerShell_fr-fr.cab”

These few characters will do the job! And again, copy and paste it to the command shell in one piece. The Dism.exe tool has a lot of of options for localizations: you can set your locales, keyboard layouts and UI languages. A full reference for this tool is here. This reference is very valuable, especially if you need support for Asian languages. The following command, for example, will set the input locale to German:

Dism /Image:”C:\WinPE_amd64\mount” /Set-InputLocale:de-DE

And this one sets all possible language options to French:

Dism /Image:”C:\WinPE_amd64\mount” /Set-AllIntl:fr-fr

Adding your preferred Digital Forensics Toolset

At this point we could close the image, copy it, or burn it to USB or DVD, and boot a minimized version of Windows 10. But now comes the highlight – we can add our tools for Digital Forensic investigations!

First, create the folder “tools” with

mkdir C:\WinPE_amd64\mount\tools

and now you can copy all your tools to this folder. In this example, we will copy several tools and application suites to this folder. The most useable applications are portable applications, but copying not-customized tools from a “Program Files” folder is often successful. After Windows 10 PE is booted, there will only be the typical DOS-like command prompt instead of the known Windows Desktop. I recommend copying a file manager like Q-Dir to the tools directory to be able to browse your toolset with a GUI. Since we are using the 64-bit version of the Preinstallation Environment, it only makes sense to copy 64-bit applications to the tools folder. The next screenshot shows an example of well-known tools for digital forensics. At this point I would like to recommend that every investigator think of their own toolset and test applications that they usually utilize for digital forensics.

Figure 3: Example toolset for File Carving, Hashing and Malware Analysis

Figure 3: Example toolset for File Carving, Hashing and Malware Analysis

Okay, we now have a usable toolset for an investigation of hard drives and artifacts. Their processes are started later from the Windows 10 PE kernel and can access an underlying hard drive and any files on it. Time to finish the build process and boot up. Dismount the image and commit all changes with the command:

Dism /Unmount-Image /MountDir:”C:\WinPE_amd64\mount” /commit

This will last several minutes, depending on the size of your added additional tools. Meanwhile Dism.exe shows a simplified progress bar as entertainment.

Figure 4: Creating the final image

Figure 4: Creating the final image

Write this file to a USB thumb drive with the following command, where D: is the drive letter for your USB device:

MakeWinPEMedia /UFD C:\WinPE_amd64 D:

Or create an ISO file, which can be booted for testing purposes by any virtualization software like VMWare or VirtualBox and later burned to DVD. In this case, copy this command to the command prompt:

MakeWinPEMedia /ISO C:\WinPE_amd64 C:\WinPE_amd64\WinPE_amd64.iso

After creating a bootable USB thumb drive or ISO file, you can close the command prompt.

Booting, Mounting, Carving

It’s time to boot! I strongly recommend playing around with Windows 10 PE as an ISO file at the beginning and starting it inside a virtual machine. You should get used to working with built-in tools like diskpart, wpeutil and your personal toolset for digital forensics before working on real cases.

Insert your USB thumb drive, put the DVD into the matching bay or configure VirtualBox to boot from your fresh made ISO file. Windows now starts and instead of using the common shell explorer.exe you can see a command prompt instead. This is the primary shell. If you close this window, Windows 10 PE will reboot, even while other applications are running. You have been warned!

The good news: most of the tools programmed for 64-bit Windows will run. I could successfully run:

Java-based software is very slow when started in this environment. Executing Autopsy or the Bulk Extractor Viewer (BeViewer), for example, is possible, but speed is a real pain.

.NET support was already added by installing the predefined packages script.

Python is running, too. I have successfully tested WinPython in 64-bit. In its subfolders you can find several batch scripts for registering this application as Python handler for *.py files.

Figure 5: Windows 10 PE has support for the X-Ways Forensics dongle

Figure 5: Windows 10 PE has support for the X-Ways Forensics dongle

Drive Access and Bitlocker

The commandline tool diskpart.exe offers you a complete interface for managing your hard drives. Just type diskpart at the command prompt to open this interactive shell. How to make a single drive writable is explained in detail in the Microsoft Knowledgebase.

Access to Bitlocker is realized with manage-bde. It is a tool you might know from the real Windows 10 Operating System and it runs smoothly in a PE environment. It allows you to decrypt encrypted hard drives, change passwords for Bitlocker, and accomplish several other tasks. And again, Microsoft has a nice documentation for its own tool here.

Network Support

Windows 10 PE does not have its networking capabilities enabled at boot time. Here wpeutil enters the game. This is a designated tool for managing the Windows Preinstallation Environment. To start the networking support for IPv4 and IPv6, type

wpeutil InitializeNetwork

That’s all. The network support then starts and the DHCP client broadcasts for a valid IP configuration in the local network. You can query the current network status with

netsh interface ipv4 show config

to get the descriptive name for all Ethernet devices. If you need a static IP configuration for network communications, the tool netsh.exe and the name of the Ethernet device are necessary.

This is an example how to set a static IP address, subnet mask and IP gateway.

netsh interface ipv4 set address name=”Ethernet” static [IP Address] [Subnet Mask] [Gateway]

Once a network connection into your LAN is established, you can map a network drive with net use and save found evidence to a network share. From now on all networking capabilities of Powershell, Python, WMIC and other frameworks can be used. Please consider the command

wpeutil EnableFirewall

if you have a direct internet connection. wpeutil carries out other tasks like rebooting Windows PE, creating a pagefile and various other settings. It allows you to change the UI to non-English languages and keyboard layouts at runtime. This is the difference between Dism and wpetutil: to configure locale and language settings in advance, use Dism. For changes at runtime while Windows PE is running, wpeutil is the tool of choice.

Common Errors

The most common errors I encountered during the overall process were:

  • Missing Administrator permissions
  • Wrong paths to the *.cab file
  • Missing “” quotation marks in conjunction with empty spaces in a file path

Some of your tools do not run because they need a writable disk and we currently do not have one. The ISO file is a read-only file and we used “SanPolicy 3” to keep all fixed hard drives (except the boot drive) in read-only mode. Your tools might run, if you map a read / write network drive and copy them over and start them. Or you use the command

setsanpolicy C:\winpe_amd64\mount 1

when creating the PE media. But in this case do not forget that Windows will mount all drives in read / write mode and might tamper the boot record of attached hard disks. If you have any problems with the Dism.exe tool, you can find debugging information at C:\Windows\Logs\DISM\dism.log

Conclusion

Having a bootable Windows with your favorite tools at your hand gives you very fast access to hard drives on the laptop or PC you are booting. As always, you should know all your tools and what they do to maintain the integrity of all evidence you find and extract. Especially in incident response scenarios, where time is essential and you won’t have to present evidence to a court, a prepared Windows 10 Preinstallation Environment media is very valuable. Properly prepared, your own Windows 10 PE could become one of your most valuable tools for malware hunting.

About the Author

Robin Brocks (GCFA, CISSP) is an IT Forensic Expert and Incident Responder. He has been working in the field of IT Forensics for the last eight years and is an experienced IT Architect, Trainer and Consultant in the IT Business since 1998. You can get in touch with him on LinkedIn.


Mobile Forensics Monkey Wrench: iOS 10.2 and Encryption

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by Patrick Siewert, Pro Digital Forensic Consulting

It’s not secret to those involved in the study and practice of mobile forensics that Apple likes to throw us curve balls with almost every new iteration of the iOS operating system. It turns out, iOS 10.2 is no different (released December 12, 2016). A conversation began recently on the IACIS list serve and got me thinking about trying to problem solve and figure out a work-around, so I spent the past day or so trying to do just that. (For those interested, I also wrote an article about the problem-solving aspect of digital forensics and you can read it here.)

The background is as follows: When an i-Device user running iOS 10.2 connects the device to a computer, they are automatically prompted by iTunes for an encryption password:

screen-shot-2017-01-13-at-9-42-36-am

When the option to encrypt is selected, a prompt is displayed for an encryption password, which may be entirely different from the device passcode or the iTunes account password:

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This default encryption prompt becomes an issue for examiners due to the fact that users often don’t remember these passwords because in the age of cloud-driven storage and wireless *everything*, users don’t routinely connect their devices to a computer and therefore, don’t remember the encryption password. This was the issue raised by another examiner on the list serve and it prompted many replies and potential work-arounds because when examiners attempt to analyze the extractions from these devices, they’re encrypted. Pretty much game over.
(For additional background on this issue as was introduced in iOS 10.0.1, please refer to Heather Mahalik’s blog on the topic located here.)

Before iOS 10, I ran across this problem a few times with iOS devices. My work-around then was to simply connect the device to a foreign computer (i.e., one that it had not been connected to previously) and de-select the encryption option and create another unencrypted backup, then pull the new backup into any number of commercial tools for analysis. This doesn’t work any longer because when the device is connected to a foreign computer and encryption is de-selected, iTunes prompts for the encryption password for verification. Darn the luck!

Methodology

For this testing, I used an iPhone 6, which we have on-hand for testing purposes. The phone has a handful of iMessages, pictures, videos, Kik messages and some other data on it. I updated the phone to iOS 10.2 and encrypted the backup on the Mac side of my forensic machine. I then switched to the Windows side and attempted to create another backup by de-selecting the “Encrypt iPhone Backup” option, which is when I quickly learned that in all updated versions of iOS and iTunes, the encryption password is needed to complete this action:

3

Being that I know the encryption password, I entered it and created a new backup via iTunes on my local machine. To be sure, unless you want to use a tool such as Elcomsoft to brute-force the password or attempt a dictionary attack based upon investigation and/or social engineering, you’ll need the encryption password to make this work. But even having the password doesn’t get us too far with Cellebrite under the current version.

How Does UFED Handle This?

Cellebrite Universal Forensic Extraction Device (UFED) Physical Analyzer (PA) has heretofore been one of the best commercial tools for acquiring and analyzing iOS devices. Indeed, you can use UFED PA to attempt a brute-force dictionary attack on these extractions if you have decent intelligence through additional investigation or social engineering by pointing UFED PA at a text file containing case-specific dictionary words:

4

In conducting this test and comparison, I used the latest version (as of this publication) of UFED PA, 5.4.7.5, which was released just 24 hours prior.  As you can see from the below image, even when the proper password is entered after an advanced logical extraction directly from the device, UFED PA still doesn’t parse the “analyzed data” into chats, web history, etc. like it used to with older versions of iOS:

5

That’s it.  That’s pretty much all we get.  When the “Backup” folder is expanded, we are presented with this:

6

The red arrow is used to illustrate that the listing of files keeps going. Further inspection of these files indicates it would be a very lengthy, tedious process to try and located you sms.db, let alone DBs from many third-party apps which can be crucial in many cases.

My next step was to create an unencrypted backup through iTunes to see if that could be pulled into UFED PA and parsed a bit nicer. It wasn’t. We are presented with a file structure identical to that which is created by iTunes, with one folder with a long alphanumeric name and dozens of sub-folders, each with a shorter alphanumeric designation. The only data that was automatically parsed in the backup was images, videos and device locations. Again, combing through all of this for your crucial evidence and databases can be a time-waster, so what else can we do? Try to use another tool!

How About IEF?

So now we have an advanced logical image in UFED PA (that is all but useless) and a backup through iTunes that is only slightly better when viewed through UFED PA. Now, I profess that push-button tools are the end of true forensics. Anyone who reads this blog knows that I firmly believe that you have to know and articulate where the data is located and how it got there. But sometimes, certain tools can help point us in the right direction. Enter Magnet Forensics’ Internet Evidence Finder (IEF, v. 6.8.4.3639). IEF is widely accepted as one of the best and easiest tools on the market to use. I love it for helping me out, for getting me a leg up on where I need to look, perhaps even with another tool. So I decided to try and pull the iTunes backup into IEF, just to see what would happen.

First, I selected the Mobile and iOS options in IEF:

7

Then, I selected “File Dump” to point IEF where I wanted it to look.

8

The next decision is probably the most crucial to the process.  I selected the Windows file browser, then navigated to the (now exported) iTunes backup folder – the one with the very long alphanumeric name.  But then I drilled down to the sub-folders and files immediately under the parent file and selected all of them, including all of the .plist and .db files:

9

Next, I had to tell IEF what I wanted it to look for.  The data set isn’t large and I’d rather have too much data to sift through than not enough, so I just chose everything and selected “next”:

10

It’s important to note here that I conducted a subsequent test selecting “iOS Backups” ONLY and did not receive a favorable outcome. Also, if the backup or device is encrypted, IEF will prompt for a password.

The processing took about 15 minutes. Once it was finished, the data was parsed out as you would have expected pre-iOS 10.2:

11

I have highlighted the file path of the location of the sms.db in the above image because now, IEF has told us where to look in UFED PA or other tools.  Consequently, we can now switch back to UFED to examine and export the .DB files as necessary.  The below image shows what we find in UFED PA when we follow the file path indicated through IEF in the iTunes backup of the iPhone:

12

So to wrap it up, get your encryption password, create a backup using iTunes on a foreign machine and bring the backup into IEF to point in you the right direction. From there, you can expand to UFED PA or another tool of your choosing, if necessary.

Take-Aways

There are several important things to take-away from this experiment. First, it has become vital in mobile forensics to have more than one tool at your disposal. Having access to two or more tools can actually save you time and effort. Imagine how tedious it would have been to sift through all of those folders (none of which contained a .db file extension by the way) to find the text messages or other pertinent data.

Second, the problem-solving aspect of “boots on the ground” forensics, especially mobile forensics, cannot be ignored. To make problem-solving a little easier, start to ask about encryption FIRST and save yourself some grief down the road. It’s also becoming apparent that we simply cannot rely on the pretty push-button features of many tools in the coming years, especially with regard to Apple and their iOS… and it’s only going to get more prevalent.

Finally, things are always changing. Never forget that. When I was conducting this testing and writing this article, I did so knowing full well that Cellebrite may push out a solution in the next week or two. But until those updates happen, we all need to collaborate to find solutions to these issues, because just like no one tool can do it all, no single examiner can always do it all.

About The Author

Patrick Siewert is the Principal Consultant of Pro Digital Forensic Consulting, based in Richmond, Virginia. In 15 years of law enforcement, he investigated hundreds of high-tech crimes, incorporating digital forensics into the investigations, and was responsible for investigating some of the highest jury and plea bargain child exploitation investigations in Virginia court history. Patrick is a graduate of SCERS, BCERT, the Reid School of Interview & Interrogation and multiple online investigation schools (among others). He continues to hone his digital forensic expertise in the private sector while growing his consulting & investigation business marketed toward litigators, professional investigators and corporations, while keeping in touch with the public safety community as a Law Enforcement Instructor. Email: ProDigitalConsulting@gmail.com; Web: www.ProDigital4n6.com


Unlocking The Screen of an LG Android Smartphone with AT Modem Commands

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by Oleg Davydov, CTO, Oxygen Forensics

Modern smartphones are much more than just a device for voice calls. Now they contain a lot of personal data – contact list, communication history, photos, videos, Geo tags etc. Most smartphones can also work as a modem.

Almost every modem is Hayes-compatible which means it supports commands of the AT language developed in 1977 by Hayes. Every model supports some basic set of commands which is defined by the manufacturer. Sometimes this set can be extended and can contain very interesting commands.

Let us study behavior of an LG smartphone. When you connect it to the computer by USB you get access to the modem automatically (pic. 1). What is peculiar for LG is that the modem is available even if the phone’s screen is locked.

Pic. 1

Thanks to that, we can learn some useful information about the phone using AT commands even if the phone is protected by a password. (pic. 2).

Pic. 2

To learn what commands are supported by this model we have to examine its firmware. For example, for Android smartphones we only need to research the file /system/bin/atd. The pictures 3-5 demonstrate some AT commands for LG G3 D855 found in this file.

Pic. 3

Pic. 4

Pic. 5

It is clear that the phone supports most of the basic AT+ command set which can be used to extract common information about it (pic. 5). But of the most interest are LG proprietary commands (commands of AT% type). These commands (like AT%IMEIx, AT%SIMID, AT%SIMIMSI, AT%MEID, AT%HWVER, AT%OSCER, AT%GWLANSSID) return basic information about the phone. Among them is hiding a real pearl – the command AT%KEYLOCK (pic. 4). As you might guess this command allows you to manage screen lock state. In order to study this command behavior we can run a debugger and use the cross-link to find its handling function code. You can see this in pic. 6.

Pic. 6

When the command AT%KEYLOCK is called, the corresponding function, depending on the argument count, calls either lge_set_keylock() or lge_get_keylock() function from the /system/lib/libatd_common.so library. Pic. 7 shows the code of function lge_set_keylock().

Pic. 7

As you can see from pic. 8, if you pass to the function lge_set_keylock() the value “0” = 0x30, it will eventually call the function which would remove the screen lock whatever method had been used to lock it (you can use PIN, password, pattern or fingerprint to do that). Then it will return the string “[0]KEYLOCK OFF” (pic. 8).

Pic. 8

It becomes obvious that the command AT%KEYLOCK=0 allows you to remove the screen lock without any additional manipulations.

It’s worth mentioning that this command only removes the screen lock without affecting user settings. The command works as described: it writes zero value (which means unlock) to the special RAM area which stores the value responsible for screen lock. This means the command does not modify ROM in any way. This behavior is forensically sound because no user data is touched and after reboot the smartphone will return to the locked state. The command does not allow the investigator to find the screen lock PIN / pattern / password; it just removes it for some time.

To perform this analysis we used an LG G3 D855 model (with V20g-SEA-XX firmware). However, the aforementioned AT commands have been proven to work on other LG smartphones as well (LG G4 H812, LG G5 H860, LG V10 H960 etc). All these models support this approach.

Therefore it’s more than easy to unlock the phone. All you need to have is an LG Android smartphone turned on and connected to a PC by USB. This backdoor is obviously left by LG for its service software but can be used for forensic purposes as well. But bear in mind that criminals can also use this approach.

Oxygen Forensics was founded in 2000 as a PC-to-Mobile Communication software company. This experience has allowed our team of mobile device experts to become unmatched in understanding mobile device communication protocols. With this knowledge, we have built innovative techniques into our Oxygen Forensic® Detective allowing our users to access much more critical information than competing forensic analysis tools. We offer the most advanced forensic data examination tools for mobile devices and cloud services. Our company delivers the universal forensic solution covering the widest range of mobile devices running iOS, Android, Windows Phone, BlackBerry and many others. Oxygen Forensic® products have been successfully used in more than 100 countries across the globe. More info at www.oxygen-forensic.com


Samsung sBrowser – Android Forensics: A Look Into The Cache Files

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by Robert Craig and Michael Lambert

Abstract

Samsung devices are a large portion of the Android OS market.  Samsung has its own Internet Browser, “sbrowser”, installed onto their devices.  All web browsers leave artifacts from user activity.  The “sbrowser” cache files were similar to other browsers.  An embedded source URL gave insight where the cached image came from.  Looking at Internet History, cookies, and the cache file itself, an investigator can gain insight where the cached image came from and the likely web page it came from.

Contents

Abstract. 2

Introduction. 3

Literature Review.. 4

Method. 4

Findings. 6

Conclusions. 11

Reference List. 12

Appendix. 13

Authors. 14

 

Introduction

Mobile device examinations have become an integral part of criminal investigations.  Suspects use the device to plan and perpetrate their crimes.  One aspect of an investigation is what Websites the user visited.  Mobile devices have the options to use multiple web-browsers such as Chrome and Firefox.

Samsung began rolling out the latest version of its Android-powered Samsung web browser found in the latest Galaxy smartphones, and it represents Samsung’s desire to create a browser built around compatibility, functionality, and ease of use [1].  On the Samsung Developers web page it explains, “Samsung Internet for Android is a Simple, Fast, and Reliable web browser for your phone and tablet. It has replaced the Android Stock browser on Samsung Galaxy devices since 2012 to provide a browser highly optimized for our devices.’[2].  In the figure below (Fig. 1), Samsung is the leading producer of smartphones.  This means as mobile device investigators encounter the Samsung devices they will see more and more of the Samsung Browser. There is also the possibility the browser can be on other devices. The Samsung Browser is also available for download on the Google Play Store.

1

Fig. 1

For the purposes of this paper the Samsung Browser will be called the “sbrowser”.  This is from the Android Samsung Browser package name “com.sec.android.app.sbrowser”(Note how it is with a smaller case “s”).

The sbrowser is similar to any other web browser found on an Android mobile device.  It will store Internet history, cookies, and web page cache files.  The files located in the cache can assist investigators in identifying where the cached images came from by reviewing the Internet history and cookies, a correlation with the cached images can be found.

Literature Review

Cache files are artifacts that are left over from webpage visits.   The presence of metadata within a cache may be an integral piece of evidence for an investigation.   This however is hampered by issues retrieving that data.   Storage location and type may be different depending on the specific app.

Hoog 2011[4] states that the webview cache database provided the metadata about the cache files stored in cache directory [5].   In Chandrakumar 2014 [6], it is reported there is large cache format diversity surrounding apps.  App developers are at liberty to choose which format their cache would be appropriate for them and single apps may use multiple cache libraries.  These cache structures are often not documented.  Chandrakumar 2014 spoke of analyzing generic caches, in doing so Chandrakumar was able to map data found inside of the generic cache folders.  This data included but was not limited to constants for header records, length of URL and the URL of the cached data.

Martini, Do and Choo [5] speak of how cached files “may expose evidential data that was temporarily stored by the app; however that non-standard binary format is commonly used and unless that format can be decoded the binary analysis of the strings may be the only straightforward means of analysis.”  Martini, Do and Choo advised format of the files are subject to the choice of the developer but things such as header analysis and other standard forensic techniques could be used to determine the potential file type which could be used to potentially decode the file.  If decoded these cache files could be extremely useful to cases as it may expand upon traditional web history data and confirm site visits, times of visits and possible content of the site visited.

Method

For the mobile device a factory reset Samsung S5 (model SM-G900R, US Cellular, Appendix A) was used.  The Android OS version on the device was 5.0.  The mobile forensic software used to acquire physical acquisitions was Cellebrite’s UFED4PC v5.2.0.689.  Cellebrite’s Physical Analyzer 5.2.5.24 was used to analyze the data.

A base physical image was done first on the device (Appendix B).  Looking at the App Data Storage Directory the com.sec.app.sbrowser cache is empty (Fig. 2).

 

2

Fig. 2 – Screen shot from Physical Analyzer 5 of the base physical extraction

 

A test web page was created for web browsing (Fig. 3).  This allowed control of the content on the page.  The purpose of the testing focused on what images would be stored in the cache. The purpose of Minion images used in this research was mainly used because of their bright color and distinct characteristics which assisted in analyzing numerous image files.

3a

Fig. 3a

Web Page and the inspect element. Note the image file path for the minion holding bananas

Fig. 3b – Web Page and the inspect element. Note the image file path for the minion holding bananas

 

 

4

Fig. 4

 

The mobile device was then connected to the Internet via a Wi-Fi connection.  The sbrowser (Fig. 4) was opened. The home page was Google.com.  The URL of the test web page was typed in, and the sbrowser displayed the web page.  At that time no further browsing was done.

The same procedure was then done on the device to acquire a physical image (Appendix C).  The second physical image was placed into Cellebrite’s Physical Analyzer 5 (PA5).  It should be noted here a physical acquisition will likely extract the Cache folder.  It has been experienced by the testers that a logical or file system extraction will not extract the Cache folder contents.

After the second physical extraction the mobile device was turned back on and reconnected to the Internet.  A revisit to the test web page was done.  Prior to returning to this test web page, it was edited (Fig. 5). The image of the tattooed man smoking and talking on a mobile device was changed to another minion.  A third physical image (Appendix D) was done using the same acquisition procedure.

5

Fig. 5

 

Findings

There were notable artifacts located in the Cache Folder.  The full path to the cached images was /Root/data/com.sec.android.app.sbrowser/cache/Cache/.  The web page images are embedded in a cache file located in the folder.  The carved web page image file name has hexadecimal characters and is 16 characters long and ends with “_0”.  This is how Cellebrite’s PA5 automatically carved the image out and named it.  The images from the cache were bookmarked (Fig. 6).

Notable images in the cache from the 2nd physical extraction.

Fig. 6 – Notable images in the cache from the 2nd physical extraction.

The cache file does contain additional information.  It contains the URL of where the web page image came from.  This URL actually points to the original image that is used to build a webpage.  This URL is located at the File Offset (FO) 24 (0x18).  This seems to be consistent with all the cache files examined.  The first (FO 0x0) 9 bytes of the cache files had the same header.  At FO 12 (0xC) for at least 2 bytes or possible 4 bytes the hexadecimal in little endian will give the length of the URL.  At FO 16 (0x10) for a length of 4 bytes is a value.  This value at first was thought to be a date and time value.  Using tools DCode v4.02a and RevEnge v1.0.34 to try and find a date and time value were unsuccessful.  It was thought that these bytes may be in reference to the size of the embedded image.  The values or combination of the values did not add up to the size.  After the embedded image there is additional information (discussed later) that has server connection information.  The value of the 4 bytes or a combination of values did not match the location of the end information.  Also, the values did not add up to the length of the file.  Below is the .jpg of the minion holding bananas in hex view (Fig. 7).  The header, size of URL, URL, and the .jpg header can all be seen.  Note the URL in the web page cache file is similar to the URL in Fig. 3.

7

Fig. 7

Fig. 8 shows the end of the cache file has additional information.  This begins after the end of the embedded image.  There is a server response that the request has succeeded (HTTP/1.1 200 OK), and the date and time.  8 bytes before HTTP/1.1 200 OK is a 3 byte long value, in this case 0xFC 9A 2E.  This value somehow is connected to “the-real-index”.  The browser appears not to store simple cache index data in the index file.  Chromium uses a similar indexing.  As explained by the Chromium Org, the “index” is extremely static, and the actual index data should be stored in a file called “the-real-index”[7].  It was observed that sbrowser has an “index” file that is small in bytes, but has a larger “the-real-index” file.  The 3 byte value discussed earlier was a constant in “the-real-index”.  In further testing an additional 3 byte value appeared during another web browsing session.  The 3 byte values appear to connect web browsing sessions with the cache file, and “the-real-index”.    The name of the server is also provided.  The last modified date and time listed is of the actual image for the web page.

The actual cache file has its own date and time created, modified, and access.  When the cache file is created on the device it will coincide with the time visiting that page.

Example of a last portion of the cache file.

Fig. 8 – Example of a last portion of the cache file.

The web history from the first physical extraction shows the last time a user visited a website (Fig 9). It should be noted that the time of the last visit is 09/13/2016 11:34:26 (UTC-5), and the server date and time above (Fig. 8) shows 09/13/2016 16:34:27 (GMT).  The date and times are the same with consideration to the time zones.

9

Fig. 9

The third acquisition was analyzed again in Cellebrite’s Physical Analyzer.  The image of the new minion (5f713e709b7a2f71_0) was created in the cache and that cache file’s creation, modified, and last accessed coincide with the time the page was visited.  The other two minion web page image cache files f053d3a13acf2646_0 & c733c38b87f0b3b3_0 (Fig. 10) last modified date and times changed.  The last modified date and time changed to the time that corresponds with the time the test web page was revisited.  However the date created and last access stayed the same.  The file itself did not change though.  The MD5 Hash value of the file from both physical extractions remained the same.  The minion web page image cache file that was no longer on the test web page dates and times stayed the same.

10a

Fig. 10a

10b

Fig. 10b

FTK v3.3.0.0 Imager used to display properties of the file below from the second and third physical extractions. The MD5 Hash value for both files was 809316767a22d168fefbadc92dcedcc8.

Internet Evidence Finder (IEF v6.8.2.3062) was also used on the third physical extraction.  This was mainly used to verify the images.  IEF did report the file the web page image was at.  IEF did display the image.  When it was viewed in hex view the entire cache file is viewed and not just the embedded image.  Just like Physical Analyzer, there is no reference in the report to the image’s resource URL.

11

Fig. 11 – Internet Evidence Finder used on 3rd physical extraction

Conclusions

A controlled web page was used to add cache contents to the mobile device.  The first (base) physical extraction showed the Cache folder to be empty.  The mobile device after visiting the test webpage populated the Cache folder with web page cache files.  There was a source URL for an embedded image within the web page cache file.  We know the date and time when we visited the web page from the Internet History.  Cookies also showed the date and times of visits to the test page.  These Cookies will show session times and first visits also.  Date and times coincided with the web page cache file and the domain name of the URL within Internet History.  The URL in the web page cache file had the same domain name as the web page as visited.  There is a strong correlation between the cached image file and the web page visited in the Internet History.  It is likely that a user could have viewed the cached image while visiting the specific web page that has the same domain name as part of the URL. In testing “http://disposablewebpage.com /turn/109EiHBBCrt” was the specific webpage.  The cached images made reference in the source URL to “http://disposablewebpage.com/”.  There is a relationship with the domain.  However, the specific webpage of the source URL in the web page cache files was not referenced.  So, in the test scenario if two different pages were used, it is possible that the source URL would have the same domain name in it, but not referenced to the exact webpage.  Web pages will pull the resource from where the image is stored, either from cache or the server.

The images in the cache can be correlated to a web-site that was visited.  The files give an indication that images found in the cache are the likely ones viewed while the user visited the specific website with the same domain name.

More research needs to be done on “the-real-index” and how it correlates with the cache files.  This research focused on the embedded source URL and embedded web page cache image.  Findings could show a user likely viewed the image stored in the cache file while visiting a web page at the time.

There are constants that do appear when within the cache.  These constants come before and after the image in set locations.  It is unknown if these constants change between devices or OS versions.  These constants also appear in the deleted cache files which would indicate that there is cache information to be gained, if not already overwritten, in the unallocated space of a device that can be linked to a recovered image.  Additional research needs to be completed in this area.

Reference List

[1] Spence, E. (2016, January 31). “Samsung Challenges Google as New Android Browser Beats Chrome”. http://www.forbes.com/sites/ewanspence/2016/01/31/samsung-android-browser-v4-html5/#12f1ed7e45ce.

[2] Samsung. (2016, March 21). http://developer.samsung.com/technical-doc/view.do?v=T000000202.

[3] Victor H. (2015, May 25). “Top 10 Smartphone makers in Q1: Sony and Microsoft Drop Out of Picture, Chinese Phone Makers Take Over.” http://www.phonearena.com/news/Top-10-smartphone-makers-in-Q1-2015-Sony-and-Microsoft-drop-out-of-the-picture-Chinese-phone-makers-take-over_id69643

[4] Hoog, Andrew (2011). “Android Forensics Investigation, Analysis, and Mobile Security for Google Android”.  Syngress, and Imprint of Elsevier.

[5] Chandrakumar, F. (2014, June 2). “An evidence-based Android cache forensic model”

[6] Martini; B., Do, Q.; Choo, K-K R (2015). Chapter 14- “Conceptual Evidence Collection and Analysis Methodology for Android Devices” In Ko R and Choo K-K R, editors, Cloud Security Ecosytem , pp. 285-307, Syngress, and Imprint of Elsevier. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-801595-7.00014-8.

[7] gavinp@chromiun.org  (2013, Apr 11). “Do not store simple cache index data in “index””. https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/isses/detail?id=230332.

Appendix

app-a

Appendix A

app-b

Appendix B

app-c

Appendix C

app-d

Appendix D

Authors

Robert Craig is a Detective with the Walworth County Sheriff’s Office in Elkhorn, WI.  He has been involved in digital forensics since 2009.  He obtained his EnCase Certified Examiner (EnCE) in 2009.  He also received formal training on the Cellebrite software in 2013. While employed at the Sheriff’s Office and in training Robert has conducted hundreds of examinations of digital evidence such as mobile devices and hard drives.  In 2016 he completed a MSc in Forensic Computing and Cyber Crime from University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland.

Michael Lambert is a Detective with the Walworth County Sheriff’s Office in Elkhorn, WI.  He has been involved in digital forensics since 2013.  He received formal training on the Cellebrite software in 2013. While employed at the Sheriff’s Office and in training Michael has conducted hundreds of examinations of digital evidence such as mobile devices.


Asking A VPS To Image Itself

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by Chris Cohen

unnamedThere is a Linux Virtual Private Server (VPS) that you have been tasked to collect using a forensically sound method while ensuring confidentiality, integrity and availability. You have the password for a user who has ssh access to a shell account on that VPS and the user is in the super user group. You do not have access to the VPS control panel, and the VPS is located in a country which does not respect any legal notices from the country you are in. You need to log into the VPS via ssh and ask it to image itself.

To ensure forensic soundness we must keep any changes we make to the VPS to a minimum, to this end we will not be installing additional software. This means we will be limited to using only the default installed applications and that we will have to transmit the forensic image across the internet as it is being created. (1) To receive the image we require a Linux collection system we control with a public IP address and enough disk space for the image.

To ensure data confidentiality we will encrypt the exfiltrated data while it is in motion; it should be noted that this encryption will make the process slower than it would be if it were not encrypted. (2)

To ensure data integrity we will take a message digest hash of the image as it is being created, which can be later compared to a hash of the image received on our collection system to prove that it was transmitted without error. Integrity will also be maintained by the transmitted data being encrypted, if it were not then a man-in-the-middle could view as well as interfere with the data as it flows.

Lastly to ensure data availability we will keep the VPS running throughout this process, which means that we get a ‘smear’ of the drive and if we were to perform the imaging process again we would likely get a different hash value.

As is typical in Linux there are usually multiple ways in which any given task can be performed, the following is just my take on this problem. I’m sure that this is just one of many possible solutions and possibly not even the best.

To create the image of the disk we will be using the by-default installed file and disk copying program dd. Dd itself does not have any built-in hashing nor encryption capabilities, so we will have to use other installed programs to perform these actions. (3)

First we need to gather some information about the VPS we are on. To find what distribution of Linux is installed on the VPS use the following command if the information wasn’t display as part of the initial login:

uname -a

To find the mounted devices, the file system on these devices, their mount point and how full they are:

df -T

To show file sizes in human readable format try df -Th.

For this article we will assume that there is a single partition mounted as /dev/vda1. The disk being /dev/vda

The following command will create a disk image of /dev/vda with padded read-errors, create a MD5 hash of it and save that hash to the file called vda.img.md5. The image data will be compressed and sent via ssh to the collection system:

sudo dd if=/dev/vda bs=128k conv=sync,noerror | tee >(md5sum > vda.img.md5) | gzip -c | ssh <user>@<IP> “dd bs=128k of=vda.img.gz”

Where <user> is the username on the collection system and <IP> is its IP address. The image file can be decompressed on the collection system by running gzip vda.img.gz -d. It’s hash can then be calculated by md5sum vda.img.

To view and then remove the file containing the md5 of the image transmitted from the VPS the following commands can be entered:

cat vda.img.md5

rm vda.img.md5

One of the problems of stringing multiple Linux commands together as above is that if multiple parts of the command require additional user input like a password to be entered, then these requests can be presented to the user simultaneously, making it impossible to successfully input the requested information. In the command above, two elements may require additional user input. Firstly the dd access to the physical disk requires a super user password and secondly the ssh connection to the collection server requires a separate password to be entered. These two password entry requests can conflict. One way around this is to provide the sudo password to a command prior to the imaging command. Before the dd command is entered do a sudo ls and enter the password when prompted and it may be cached for subsequent sudo commands. If that fails (perhaps the VPS has been configured to not cache sudo passwords) then the sudo password can be passed in-line as below with the password being password:

echo ‘password’ | sudo -S dd if=/dev/vda bs=128k conv=sync,noerror | tee >(md5sum > vda.img.md5) | gzip -c | ssh <user>@<IP> “dd bs=128k of=vda.img.gz”

Outbound ssh connections to new locations also require further user input to confirm that a connection is desired to the host. Subsequent connection attempts do not require this additional input, so to avoid the conflict, create and break a ssh session to the collection server prior to running the dd command, this will also confirm the accessibility of the server.

The ssh command cannot take an in-line password, and other than installing the public key of our VPS (which may not even have been created) on the collection server, a password will have to be entered for the ssh connection. The calculated md5 cannot be sent via ssh, as a separate ssh connection would require an additional password to be entered with the ensuring conflict in entering it. This is why for the commands shown above the calculated md5 was saved to a text file on disk. While creating a file is not ideal, the file is only small and therefore is unlikely to cause any issues. Lets not forget that just connecting to the VPS will make changes to multiple files.

If you wish to avoid directly creating any files on the disk one way to do this is to send the hash via netcat (which does not require a password to be entered but will also sends the data unencrypted) with the following commands:

On collection system:

nc -l <port> > vda.img.md5

On VPS:

sudo dd if=/dev/vda bs=128k conv=sync,noerror | tee >(md5sum | nc <IP> <port>) | gzip -c | ssh <user>@<IP> “dd bs=128k of=vda.img.gz”

If you want to hash the data before it is compressed as well as after (so you have a hash of the disk itself as well as the data actually sent – which to my mind is overkill) you can do so with this command which will save the hashes to disk:

sudo dd if=/dev/vda bs=128k conv=sync,noerror | tee >(md5sum > vda.img.md5) | gzip -c | tee >(md5sum > vda.img.gz.md5) | ssh <user>@<IP> “dd bs=128k of=vda.img.gz”

Or this command which sends the hashes via netcat:

On collection system – enter these two commands into two separate terminal windows, so both run concurrently:

nc -l 9000 > vda.img.md5

nc -l 9001 > vda.img.gz.md5

On evidence VPS:

sudo dd if=/dev/vda bs=128k conv=sync,noerror | tee >(md5sum | nc <IP> 9000) | gzip -c | tee >(md5sum | nc <IP> 9001) | ssh <user>@<IP> “dd bs=128k of=vda.img.gz”

In all commands sha1sum can be used instead of md5sum but it will take slightly longer.

The block size does not have to be set at 128k, the best block size can be determined by running tests, although the results will be pretty individual to that tested device. Therefore I’ve plumped for a nice sensible 128k.

When these imaging command are running we will not receive any information about its progress, while dd itself has an option to show its progress, turning this on interferes with the ssh password entry so it has to remain off. To determine how (and indeed if) the command is progressing you can use the following commands which will continually report the progress of the dd command every 5 seconds:

ctrl-z     < this temporarily halts the command and returns the command prompt

bg     < this backgrounds and resumes the command

jobs -l     < this shows what tasks you have running and their Process IDs

while true; do sudo kill -USR1 <PID>; sleep 5; done

Where <PID> is the process ID of the running command as shown by the jobs command. To break out of the loop and return the backgrounded command to the foreground, do a ctrl-c and then a fg.

Note, running any of these disk imaging command is likely to greatly change the memory of the VPS, so if you’re interested in taking a memory dump then do that first.

Tested on:

  • Ubuntu 16.04.1 LTS.
  • Fedora 25 x64
  • Debian 8.6 x64
  • CentOS 7.3.1611

 

Chris Cohen

chris.w.cohen@gmail.com

 

(1) For the benefit of this article we will assume that no tools have been removed in an effort to harden the system and that we can trust the tools already installed. If this isn’t the case then we could transfer known good statically-compiled tools to our VPS, although this is out of scope of this article.

(2) Encryption could be omitted if the data is being transferred over a LAN, though in this scenario it is travelling the public internet and therefore encryption should be used.

(3) The Linux forensic imaging program dcfldd does have the ability to hash-on-the-fly but it is not installed as standard on any common distribution.



Nuix Web Review & Analytics: Process, Search And Review Evidence In A Single Workflow

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by Scar de Courcier, Forensic Focus

Background

Nuix Web Review & Analytics (WR&A) was created to enable analysts and non-technical investigators to collaborate on investigations.

The tool allows a senior investigator or case supervisor to allocate and assign data to individuals within a case. They can then log into the web interface to look through data, which will help them to assist technical investigators.

Once they have been set up, analysts can then start investingating and analysing elements of the case, even if they do not have any techncial knowledge. Quite often, the case officer will be the person who knows the case best, but they are also often the ones who have not been trained to run a given forensic product – with Nuix WR&A, the idea is to enable them to use the Nuix suite of products alongside WR&A by providing a non-tehcnical inferface with which they can interact.

This can be particularly useful in cases such as IP theft, where you might need to show data to HR representatives, but this is much more easily done via a user-friendly web interface than by sitting them in front of a full forensic product.

WR&A is part of the standard Nuix suite, so once a case has been created in workbench, it can easily be brought into Web Review. The data can then instantly be available to the relevant individuals as soon as the image has been loaded.

What it does

WR&A will sit in a central environment, which can be on either a local or an external network. One important thing to note is that, despite the name, WR&A doesn’t need to be web-facing. Many users will simply interact with WR&A on a local network; it does not have to be on the internet. If preferred, however, it can also be hosted online.

At the outset, Nuix WR&A will provide a URL to a given user. They can then log into the web interface to view and analyse the case. When they first log in, they will reach a dashboard where they will be greeted with cases they have access to.

The administrator can control what others are able to see at a very granular level. It is possible to restrict a user’s case view to a particular file, or just a portion of the evidence. The options range from a full interface with analytics, visuals and interactive options, all the way back to a basic document review. The administrator controls the permissions via the Groups and Users menus at the top of the screen.

groupsOnce a user logs in, they will only see the cases they have been given access to. Depending on their permissions, they can then distribute tasks and assign different sets of data to other individuals. This is a particularly useful feature as it is often the case that multiple people might be investigating the same case, but all with different abilities and needs. Within Nuix WR&A, it is possible to show every user different things about the case, thus only allowing relevant data to be shown to the right people and lessening confusion at the user level.

The interface is particularly user-friendly; anyone who is used to using Gmail, Facebook, or similar web-based interfaces should have no problem navigating around. Under ‘Emails’, for example, it is possible to click through and read a message; select multiple messages; and apply bookmarks, just like you would in an inbox setting. Decisions can be made on the right-hand side, along with notes and comments for the attention of other investigators.

Viewing metadata and information around the file is also straightforward. The user can go to a review tab which allows them to go through items one by one. For example, a non-technical investigator could look through the documents relevant to a case, tag them or write comments about them for the attention of a technical investigator. This will then be saved as part of the Nuix case, after which a technical investigator can go through what others have tagged as relevant, take a closer look, start producing reports, and so on. There is no limit on the number of investigators that can be added to a given case.

search

 

The Search bar (pictured above) uses the same query syntax as standard Nuix products. If a user wants to narrow things down after performing a search, they will find at the top of the screen several buttons which allow filtering based on file type and so on.

Once a search has been run, the preview pane will show an overview of the item in question and whether there are any attachments, along with metadata. The user can then make a decision regarding whether to take a closer look at this item or tag it as not relevant and move on to other items in the case.

wra_5

The gallery view is a particularly useful tool that allows a user to see thumbnails of any images that may be relevant to the investigation. Once again, it looks a lot like a file folder or a search engine’s image results page, making it easily comprehensible and navigable for the average user.

gallery

From the gallery view, it is possible to highlight duplicates, select items, and pull items into a separate window for more detailed analysis. Again, a pane on the right hand side of the screen allows the user to make decisions, add comments and assign tasks. Users can also easily see whether an item has been attached to an email or has formed part of an MMS message, among other things.

Once data has been extracted from a given deviced and indexed by Nuix, it will automatically be available to view in WR&A. This coincides with all the file support Nuix offers; regardless of whether a user is examining a desktop, mobile device, items from Cellebrite, XRY, Oxygen or similar, everything can be brought in to be viewed.

geolocation

Mobile data can be easily distinguished and viewed using the ‘mobile’ button, which when clicked will show call logs and any other relevant data. Users can custom-design their own metadata profiles, meaning that each person can look at the elements in which they are specifically interested. Investigations can also be carried out simultaneously across different devices, showing collaboration of suspects and commonalities between devices.

wra_7

Non-technical analysts will be particularly interested in the Analytics section, where a user can start visualising information and then drill down to a more in-depth view. Multiple visualisation techniques are available, and the visualisations are completely interactive. As a user clicks on different parts of a visualisation, the backdrop will refresh – so the user can use the visual to create or filter criteria.

wra_6For example, if a user wanted to find out about timelines, they could define a date range in the Visualisation screen, then drill down further by hovering over a location. Automatically the background will refresh, showing all of the items using the visual. All of these items will be within the time frame selected and will also refer to any other parameters the user has chosen. Call records, images and other actions within that time frame can then easily be seen. If call records are found, the user can also see who has been talking to whom during the specified period, potentially helping to identify collaboration between suspects. These options are available for all mobile elements – not just call records but also texts, data from WhatsApp and Skype, emails, and so on.

The language selection tool is also very useful; this allows a user to see which languages have been used by specific individuals within their data sets. Again, if something of interest is found, it is then possible to drill down further and see the specific list of items behind the visual.

Analytics can be combined into a dashboard, which can be fully customised on a per-user basis. This will show an overview of the case being worked on when the user first starts up, giving them an overview before they start looking at individuals items. The dashboards can be completely bespoke to the user, so for a counter terror investigation it might be useful to see the languages used and the main people who are communicating with one another. A fraud investigation might require a list of monetary values, email accounts, and companies involved.

The interface is highly intuitive and in general users need a maximum of two hours’ basic training before they are able to use WR&A.

Nuix Web Review & Analytics offers a simple interface that enables people with minimal training or technology expertise to search, review and tag data. This powerful web analytics software delivers fast, collaborative review for eDiscovery and  investigation cases. It provides secure and compartmentalized access to case data for multiple reviewers, investigators, lawyers, analysts subject matter experts and external parties—and it rapidly scales to tens or hundreds of reviewers per case, with no complex databases or tricky client plugins to install. Find out more: nuix.com/webreview


Techno Security 2017 – Myrtle Beach 4th – 7th June

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From the 4th to the 7th of June 2017, Forensic Focus will be attending the Techno Security & Digital Forensics Conference in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, USA. If there are any topics you’d particularly like us to cover, or any speakers you think we should interview, please let us know in the comments.

Below is an overview of the subjects and speakers that will be featured at Techno Security.

Sunday June 4th

Throughout the week, the conference will be split into seven tracks: Audit / Risk Management, Forensics, Information Security, Investigations, Sponsor Product Demos, Cellebrite Lab, and Magnet Forensics Lab. Attendees will be able to dip in and out of each track depending on their interests. Forensic Focus will mainly be following the Forensics and Investigations tracks throughout the conference.

Sunday will begin at midday, with various options for attendees to choose from. Anne-Marie Moore and Chris Adamczyk from Media Sonar Technologies will discuss how digital forensic investigations are having to increase in speed in order to keep up with the increasing pace of life in a technological world. The talk will cover information for practitioners from all sectors and will focus on using social media tools and methodologies to respond to cyber attacks and uncover information.

Meanwhile, forensic examiner Colin Fagan will be demonstrating a case study of how to use Cellebrite to unlock encrypted devices, and how the information gleaned from this procedure can help investigators who are working on cold cases. Larry Daniel of Guardian Digital Forensics will show attendees of the Forensics track how to identify and react to faked communications, and Ron Dormido from Kroll will show how the Linux Analysis Platform can be a great help to forensic investigations.

Apple iOS devices will be the subject of discussion at the 1pm Forensics track, alongside a talk about the forensic value of hybrid drives, and Magnet Forensics’ Jessica Hyde’s discussion of how security applications and anti-forensic measures are affecting investigations.

Many investigators, particularly those who are relatively new to the field, worry about having to appear in court to defend their results. Herbert Joe, an attorney at Yonovitz & Joe LLP, will talk attendees through the legal qualifications required of security expert witnesses in state and federal courts across the USA.

Richard Spradley from Whooster will discuss investigative database discoveries, including how to tell the difference between real-time and historic information, and how to effectively utilise the investigative databases available to law enforcement professionals.

On the Information Security track, Leo Pate from Atlantic will talk about cyber threat models – the pros and cons of various model types, and what your organisation could be doing better. Meanwhile Rene Novoa from Drivesavers will demonstrate some of the newest ransomware techniques and will look at the importance of Bitcoin to ransom demands in cyberspace.

At 3pm, Bob Petrachek from BlackBag will talk attendees through Windows memory forensics and its uses in investigations. SSA John O’Brien will discuss the application of digital forensic techniques to prescription drug investigations, and following this Eric Wahlberg of Final Mobile Forensics will answer the question of whether alternative data recovery methods are able to stand up in a court of law.

The day will be rounded off by Sasha Sheremetov from Rusolut, who will demonstrate chip-off forensics, with a particular focus on data recover after deletion in flash memory.

Monday June 5th

Monday’s keynote address at 8am will be given by Christopher Church from INTERPOL. After this, the conference will split into its tracks from 9.30 onwards.

The opening options include a demonstration of CRU’s latest digital forensics and ediscovery solutions; a discussion of passcode breaking and mobile forensics by Jeremy Kirby of Susteen; an overview of the Pulse nightclub case study by investigator Ed Michael from Cellebrite; and a discussion by Nicola Chemello of Securcube regarding the increasing role of cell tower data in digital forensic investigations.

In the Information Security track at 10:30, Robert Slocum from Forcepoint will talk about how to better understand end users and the cyber security risks they present, and how organisations can use this knowledge to build better security solutions.

Lee Reiber from Oxygen Forensics will be giving the intriguingly titled discussion ‘The Forensic Kill Chain’, which will look at how concepts used in military combat can be applied to the computer security model of cyber attacks. Alongside this, in the Investigations track, attendees will be introduced to the four dimensions of breach investigations – people, objects, locations, and events – and how the connections between apparently unrelated facts can be uncovered and used in investigations.

Following a lunch break, the tracks will discuss forensics for auditors; automation of threat hunting and triage; the security implications of the internet of things; and the dark side of P2P applications and shared content.

At 3:30pm Jimmy Schroering from DME Forensics will look at suveillance digital video recorders and their potential uses in digital forensic investigations. Ben LeMere from Berla will take attendees through a case study that will demonstrate how to collect and analyse digital data from motor vehicle systems, as well as mobile devices that can connect to these. And Jerry Diamond from MSAB will show how to deconstruct SQLite databases as part of the Forensics track.

The day will draw to a close with three talks, including a discussion of dark web investigative techniques by Stephen Arnold from ArnoldIT, and an overview of the current state of Mac forensics by Steve Whalen from SUMURI.

Tuesday June 6th

Matthew Rosenquist from Intel will kick off Tuesday’s programme with the keynote speech at 8am, after which Kenny Wong will demonstrate some of SalvationDATA’s digital forensics solutions.

Chip-off forensics is a hotly contested and highly delicate process, so the 9:30am talk by Bob Elder from Teel Technologies will be of interest to anyone who is thinking of employing this methodology in their investigations. Elder will discuss non-heat methods for chip removal, namely “polishing” and “milling”.

Jad Saliba from Magnet Forensics will discuss the Internet of Things, and how to make it relevant to forensic investigations; and Stanley Francois will give a review of regulations and standards for the executive management of cyber information warfare. Meanwhile, Kahrmann Ziegenbein from Toonari will be giving an overview of exculpatory evidence in social media investigations.

At 10:30 the Forensics track will see a discussion of drone forensics, while Oleg Davydov will demonstrate the speed of Oxygen Forensics’ products when applied to Android forensics.

Following a break for lunch, Mathieu Gorge from VigiTrust will discuss the security implications of health data and what users can do to try to protect themselves from hackers. Christine Townsend from MusterPoint Solutions will show how everyone within an organisation, whether they are a trained analyst or not, can uncover useful information from open source areas such as social media analysis; and in the Forensics track, a panel discussion will be held on the future of mobile forensics.

At 3:30pm Zuly Gonzalez from Light Point Security will help online criminal investigators to understand how to keep their cover intact, and a dual discussion by Cisco and the Department of Homeland Security will talk about how the Internet of Things might be about to revolutionise intelligence collection and analysis. Meanwhile a panel discussion will be held on potentially new ways to approach the acquisition and analysis of digital evidence.

The day will draw to a close with two track options: Lee Reiber will demonstrate how to use Oxygen Forensics’ solutions to uncover deleted data from applications; and Stephen Arnold from ArnoldIT will demonstrate open source and commercial options for deep web investigations.

Wednesday June 7th

An in-depth session from 9:00-11:50am will look at how DDoS attacks work. Using a live portable computer lab, the speakers will demonstrate how a black hat hacker launches a DDoS attack, and how various software solutions can help to combat and investigate such attacks. Attendees will be given free toolkits along with free downloadable software and research papers on DDoS attacks.

Alongside this, another in-depth discussion will be focusing on streamlined child exploitation investigations and what best practices in these cases look like for digital forensics practitioners.

Later on in the morning, Shelley Ma and Elizabeth Cookson from Kivu Consulting will look at how to uncover and analyse residual artifacts from private and incognito browsers, as well as TOR forensics.

The remainder of Wednesday’s program will be available shortly on the Techno Security website.

Additional Programs

As well as the conference itself, there will be additional options for attendees to explore throughout the week. From Wednesday May 30th – Saturday June 3rd, representatives from Cellebrite, Magnet Forensics, and Teel Technologies will be demonstrating how their solutions can be used in various types of digital forensic investigations. Further details can be found here.

Sessions for the Cellebrite Lab, Magnet Forensics Lab, and Sponsor Demos are still in development and will be finalised soon.

Forensic Focus will be in attendance throughout the conference, and you can see the full programme and register here. If there are any topics you would particularly like to see covered in-depth, or if there are any speakers you would like to see interviewed, please leave a comment below or email scar@forensicfocus.com with suggestions.


A Survey On Data Carving In Digital Forensics

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by Nadeem Alherbawi*, Zarina Shukur & Rossilawati Sulaiman; Faculty of Information Science and Technology, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia

Abstract

Data carving is a very important topic in digital investigation and computer forensics. And for that reason research is needed to focus on improving data carving techniques to enable digital investigators to retrieve important data and evidence from damaged or corrupted data resources. This paper is the result of a systematic literature review which answers three main questions in data carving filed. The Results fall into four main directions. First it shows the need of realistic data sets for tools testing. Secondly, it points to the need of object validation under fragmented data storage. Thirdly, investigating content based validation and its benefits in digital investigation field. Finally, it points to a new direction in data carving such as in-place data carving, bulk extractor and using semantic validation in data carving. Finally, a set of potential areas of interest are pointed out that needs further research and investigation.

Introduction

Digital or computer forensics is defined as the practice of identifying, preserving, extracting, analyzing and presenting legally sound evidence from digital media such as computer hard drives [1]⁠. Since the past ten years digital forensics has changed from a technique which was almost solely used in law enforcement to an invaluable tool for detecting and solving corporate fraud. As digital forensics plays a vital role in solving digital crimes it is worth being investigated. The following section describes this role of file recovery in a forensic setting.

During a digital forensic investigation many different pieces of data are preserved for investigation, of which bit-copy images of hard drives are the most common way for the process [2]⁠. These images contain the data allocated to files as well as the unallocated data. The unallocated data may still contain information relevant to an investigation in the form of intentionally deleted or automatically make a deletion of temporary files. Unfortunately, this data is not always easily accessible. However, a string search on the raw data might recover interesting text documents, but it would not help getting information present in, for example, images or compressed files. Beside, the exact strings to look for may not be known beforehand. Getting to this information, the deleted files have to be recovered.

There are multiple ways to recover files from the unallocated space. Most techniques use information from the file system to locate and recover deleted files. The advantage of this approach is that it’s relatively fast and the meta-information, such as last access date, can often be recovered as well [3]⁠. The downside of this approach is that these techniques become much less effective if the file system information is corrupted or overwritten. In these cases, a new technique that works independently without need of the file system information is required. In other words, this can be done by identifying the deleted files and file parts directly in the raw data and extracting them in a verifiable manner [4]⁠.

Motivation

Carving is a general term for extracting files out of raw data, based on file format specific characteristics present in that data. Moreover, carving only uses the information in the raw data, not the file system information. Nicholas Mikus wrote “Disc carving is an essential aspect of Computer Forensics and is an area that has been somewhat neglected in the development of new forensic tools” [5]⁠. In the two years since this thesis the field of carving has evolved considerably, but there are still many possible areas of improvement.

Most notably, there are a few different carving techniques and there is no standard method of rating or comparing between them. Also little scientific information on carving and the results of carving tools which needs to be improved. This means that this field provides multiple possibilities for projects that combine scientific research into fundamental carving issues with practical improvements of carving tools [6]⁠.

In 2006 the Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) issued a challenge to digital forensic researchers worldwide to design and develop file carving algorithms that identify more files and reduce the number of false positives. Nine teams took up this challenge. The final results of this challenge, and its winners, caused some discussion on how a carving tool should be rated. The winning team used manual techniques to recover the deleted files, which, as Metz and Mora stated, does not scale for realistic data sizes [7]⁠. Finally, most current carving tools focus on data recovery rather than evidence search, which results in many lost potential evidences that could be used in a court of law; for that reason a study of literature is needed to discover needs and gaps.

Systematic Literature Review

In order to review the current state of the art related to data carving in digital investigation point of view, a systematic literature review has been done following the procedures mentioned by [8]⁠. The research questions that need to be raised are in the Table 1.

The search was done on several digital libraries and databases, the language in the searching process was English. The publishing date was not defined. Focus was only on the articles that are related to computer forensics, or digital investigation on disk area. All other irrelevant area articles were dropped.

Sources of digital libraries and databases that have been searched were IEEEXplore, Springer link, Scopus, Science Direct, ACM, and DFRWS (Digital Forensics Research Conference). Table 2 shows search strings used in above mentioned sources.

The initial search ran in October 2011. Table 3 presents all findings related to each source. The selection of study involves multiple phases. First potentially relevant studies were identified using search strings, then screening made on the title and abstract of the publications. As a result a large number of publications were excluded based on their irrelevance to the research questions. On the other hand, if there was any doubt about the inclusion of potential publications the full paper would be obtained for further assessment [8]⁠.

In terms of the quality of publications, a full text scanning has been made on the final set of the journals. Mendeley software has been used to manage all publications and citations. As a result a set of publications has been included in the review based on its relevancy to the research questions mentioned in table I and based on the clearance of their objectives and methodology.

3.1 Data extraction

Table 4 represents a sample of data extraction form that consist of five sections. Namely publication title, Methodology used by the author, questions answered by publication depending on table 1, and finally Tag which relates the content of Table 4 with Figure 1.

3.2 Analysis of the results

In this section an analysis of the results of the systematic literature review will be shown. Figure 1 represents a general illustration of the answers for the research questions mentioned previously in table 1. Consequently, an elaborative analysis will follow in the next paragraphs.

The techniques used in file carving answer one of the Research questions. Fragmentation is considered as a serious issue and because of that, techniques were developed to consider it. For contiguous data it is usually easy to be carved using header / footer techniques which use header of specific file type and its footer as a unique identification flag. After that all the data between the header and footer will be considered as a file data section. Most of the standard formats have their own unique headers and footers which will be used in the carving process to identify and recover data.

Additionally fragmented data has a different story. The previous technique will not work since the header and its respective footer maybe not be sequentially ordered, and accordingly another file footer may exist in between. As a result if the previous technique is being used then the carver will recover a bad corrupted file. In this way, a general approach called ‘file structure based carving’ has been introduced. For each type file or category of files a different technique is needed since the carver needs to check and use the structure inside the data blocks to decide if these blocks of data are consistent and consider as one coherent unit in a file [15]⁠.

To clarify, if we take JPEG file format, the carver uses the Huffman code table to identify file fragments by comparing the table results with the results of matching blocks, which may or may not have fragments of that file. Additionally, another file format has its different way of identifying file fragments and much research is done on this field considering many different file formats including zip files, PDF files, PNG, and XML based documents such as DOCX. For each one of these file formats a different technique will be used to recover them [1]⁠.

The above technique used to recover fragmented data still produces high false positive rates. Since the file structure of the file which is used to identify fragments may be missing, or altered, or corrupted, carvers produce a higher number of potential files which lead to double or triple the storage size of carved data [16]⁠.

The previous paragraphs form an introduction to the traditional form of data carving and its issues. On the other hand in the following sections a review of a new non traditional data carving techniques will be covered. The first section covers In-place carving. The second section covers forensic feature extraction and bulk extractor. The last section covers the topic of object validation in data carving and datasets.

A. In-place carving

In-place carving is one type of data carving which reduces the amount of recovered data which may get multiplied hundred times of the original media size. For example in one case carving of a wide range of file types from 8 GB target results in a total carved files which was over 250 GB of storage [17]⁠.

The issue of the current practice of file carving is recovering data into new files which holds a big performance cost that is inherent and cannot be solved by optimizing the file carving software. The only argument for this approach is that virtually all the carvers used to view or process the recovered data need a file based interface to the data. A new approach is needed that adds a file system interface to the output of the carver without actually creating carved files. Particularly if a file system interface is arranged to candidate files without physically recreating files, existing file carvers can still be used without creating new files, many of which will likely be invalid. This approach is called “in-place” file carving. The technique is similar to that used by current file systems, except that file system metadata is stored outside the target [17]⁠.

Figure 2 illustrates the differences between traditional and in-place carving. The host file system and forensic target can be thought of as “input” to both traditional and in-place carving. In traditional carving, both the metadata and the data for carved files are dumped into the host file system, and the target has no significant role after the carving operation completes. In the case of in-place carving, a database of metadata is inserted into the host file system, indicating where potentially interesting files are located in the target . In order to use the in-place technique and save time and space, a multi-level system is proposed. [17]⁠ Suggest an in-place carving architecture, the first part of the proposed architecture ScalpelFS. ScalpelFS comprises three main elements, the first one is Scalpel v1.60, which provides a new mode called preview, made of a custom FUSE file system that is the second element for the purpose of providing a standard file system view of carved files. The third element is the Linux network block device, for the purpose of carving of remote disk targets.

The Dutch National Police Agency has proposed another similar approach named as the carved path zero storage Library and filesystem (CarvFs). They develop a library that provides the low-level needs of zero storage carving. It does this by providing an interface to hierarchically ordered fragment lists, and allowing these fragment lists to be converted to and from virtual file paths. These particular virtual file paths can be used in conjunction with the CarvFS filesystem, a pseudo filesystem build using fuse and LibCarvPath [13]⁠.

Finally in-place carving helps a digital investigator to reduce the numbers of carved files which need to be analyzed and examined for evidence, which reduces the time needed by the investigator. Also in-place carver is in many cases faster than regular carvers. For instance 16 GB storage needs 30 minutes extra when a traditional carver Scalpel is used [18]⁠.

B. Forensic Feature Extraction And Bulk Extractor

Forensic investigators become the victims of their achievement. Since digital storage devices in all different shapes are such valuable sources of information, they are now routinely seized in many digital investigations. As a result, investigators do not have the time to investigate all the storage devices that comes across their desks. When the investigator is available, the contents of the device are copied to a working storage drive to maintain chain of custody. This bit to bit copy of the drive is then opened or mounted using a forensic tool, after that the investigator can perform variety of analyses such as string searches or manually exploring the image. When the analysis is finished, the copy is removed from the system, and the investigator handles the next drive.

The previously mentioned approach has multiple drawbacks as has been pointed out by [19]⁠. First, it has priority issue related to which has to come first the resources and storages or the attention of the examiner on the value of information that the storage media contains. The second issue is related to the lost potential correlation among data from various storages, files, and objects, which can help in connecting all the dots related to the case on the hand. Finally, traditional forensic tools focus on recovering documents while the traditional approach neglects data on the drive that cannot be reconstructed to be filed. Forensic tools should be enhanced and adapted to be evidence focused rather than documents and files recovery.

Currently, two general techniques are common in the processing of digital evidence that balance each other: file-based approaches and bulk data analysis. The file-based technique is widely used by digital forensic investigators and many popular tools such as EnCase and AccessData’s FTK implement this approach. This kind of approach operates by finding, identifying, extracting and processing files pointed by file system metadata [10]⁠. This has multiple advantages among other techniques since it’s easy to understand, and it integrates well with most legal systems since extracted files can be easily utilized as evidence. On the other hand, it suffers from ignoring data that are not contained within files or not pointed out by metadata entries [2]⁠.

On the other hand, bulk data analysis techniques examine data storage and identify potential evidence based on content, then process and extract without returning or using file system metadata. An example of this approach is file carving, but it has the limitation of ignoring bulk data that cannot be assembled into files. Both methods – file based and bulk data analysis – complement each other. In a file-based approach, the results are easier to put in context and to be explained to an individual who does not have technical knowledge. On the other hand, bulk data analysis applies on all kinds of computer systems, file systems and file types since it does not rely on the metadata of the file system. Additionally, it also can be applied on damaged or partially overwritten storage media.

Feature extraction technique is a new model for bulk analysis that works by first scanning and searching for pseudo-unique features which are an identifier that it has sufficient singularity such that within a giving data it is highly unlikely that the identifier will be repeated by chance, and then storing the results in an intermediate file. An example of both feature extraction and pseudo-unique features is and email extractor which can recognize RFC822-style email addresses via unique identifiers which are the Message-ID value [19]⁠.

The bulk extractor is an example of a tool that applies the two previously mentioned approaches above. The program operates on multiple disk images, file, or a directory and extracts useful information without returning to the file system metadata [10]⁠. The results can be easily checked, determined, or processed with automated procedures. Bulk extractor also creates histograms of the occurrence of features that it finds since features that are more common in the media tend to be more important.

The bulk extractor has multiple scanners that run sequentially on target digital evidence, and each scanner record extracted features in a certain mechanism and then the tool performs post-processing for the extracted features and then exits. The bulk extractor has two types of scanner, basic and recursive. An example of a basic scanner is an email scanner that searches for email addresses, RFC822 headers, and other recognizable strings in the email message. A recursive scanner, as the name implies, can decode data and pass it back for re-analysis for further scanning. An example of this kind of scanner is zip-scanner, since a compressed file may contain multiple types of other data forms and files.

C. Object Validation In Data Carving and Datasets

Object validation in carving is also considered an issue. Garfinkel defined object validation as the process of determining which sequence of bytes represent a valid JPEG or PNG or any kind data. Object validation is a subset of file validation since some files may contain multiple objects and for that the carver may recover these objects separately [11]⁠.

Another important topic in object validation is using content validation, which we will focus on in our development of an enhanced in-place carver. In general, content validation tries to validate files based on content, such as using semantic validation that uses human languages in the process of validation. That kind of validation works well with document type files. Over and above content validation can be used as a part of in-place carving to identify specific files based on its content. This approach can be more beneficial in the digital investigation process. For instance, if the investigator wants to find out any evidence of any malicious act, he can use in-place carving with a focus on searching in the content part of files to scrutinize any kind of malicious code. If the carver found such a code it will carve that file. The last issue is to use aspects of languages such as English as validation indicators. Many authors suggest semantic validation for the results of carving tools to reduce false positive rates. More work needs to be done for the purpose of automating this approach and supporting many languages. [20]

Finally, testing the carving tools is another major issue. It deals with how to measure the tools’ performance, accuracy, and false positive / negative rate. In this matter Garfinkel points out the need for a  realistic dataset, which can be used to test and validate files that have been recovered [2]⁠. This will enable researchers to figure out weaknesses in the developed tools and increase their quality. The same author developed the most used corpus for testing carving tools, which was used by the DFRWS challenge in 2006. Developing a realistic dataset is not an easy goal since researchers need a huge number of disks and also permission from users who own these disks to be able to use them for research purposes [9]⁠.

Conclusion

Throughout the whole process illustrated above, four main areas have been defined. The first one is the need for a real dataset or corpus that will be used to better test the carving tools and the results. There are a few realistic datasets which can be used for testing purposes, but those current ones do not reflect real complexity and openness. To achieve this a framework for developing automated solution, a more realistic dataset is needed.

Secondly validation: this is necessary in fragmented files, especially in the domain of digital forensics. For example if we have a sequence of bytes, then the process of validation has to produce a valid file. To clarify, for JPEG file, the process validation will depend its internal structure, i.e., the entries of Huffman table. Since each file type has a different internal structure more research is needed to cover all kinds of data types, which needs its own way of validation.

Thirdly semantic validation, which uses languages in the process of validating files, is an urgent issue. For instance if we have a text file or a document the content of the file should contain valid words, furthermore the file can be known as invalid if the carved file has nonsense words that do not have meaning. Therefore that file is carved incorrectly. Using the above approach will reduce false positive rates. Accordingly, more investigation is needed regarding semantic validation. Another potential point is to investigate new ways for feature bulk analysis, which is essential for encoded data such as MP3 files and JPEG images, since current models and tools search for features from text based files such as docs and text files.

Finally enhancing the carving validation process to enable it to detect injected codes, hidden data or potential evidence is needed by digital investigators. Most of the validation process focuses on testing the file structure as an indicator of file validity but not concentrating on the content of the file itself. For example, if we have a picture recovered correctly by the carver, and within the data blocks of the picture malicious code were hidden, this kind of information is very important in the field of digital investigation. For that reason content based validation from a digital forensic point of view is essentially needed.

References

[1] D. Povar and V. K. Bhadran, “Forensic data carving,” in Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST, 2011, vol. 53, pp. 137–148.
[2] S. L. Garfinkel, “Digital forensics research: The next 10 years,” Digit. Investig., vol. 7, pp. S64–S73, Aug. 2010.
[3] A. Pal and N. Memon, “The Evolution of File Carving,” IEEE Signal Process. Mag., no. March, pp. 59–71, 2008.
[4] C. J. Veenman, “Statistical disk cluster classification for file carving,” Proc. – IAS 2007 3rd Int. Symp. Inf. Assur. Secur., pp. 393–398, 2007.
[5] Nicholas Mikus, “AN ANALYSIS OF DISC CARVING TECHNIQUES,” 2005.
[6] L. Aronson and J. Van Den Bos, “Towards an Engineering Approach to File Carver Construction,” 2011 IEEE 35th Annu. Comput. Softw. Appl. Conf. Work., pp. 368–373, Jul. 2011.
[7] B. J. Metz, “Shrinking the gap : carving NTFS-compressed files,” October, no. October 2009, 2009.
[8] M. M. Yusof, “SOFTAM : Systematic Review Hands-on Workshop,” Rev. Lit. Arts Am., pp. 1–12, 2011.
[9] S. L. Garfinkel, “Forensic corpora: a challenge for forensic research,” Electron. Evid. Inf. Center, April, pp. 1–10, 2007.
[10] S. L. Garfinkel, “Digital media triage with bulk data analysis and bulk-extractor,” Comput. Secur., vol. 32, pp. 56–72, 2013.
[11] S. Garfinkel, “Carving contiguous and fragmented files with fast object validation,” Digit. Investig., vol. 4, pp. 2–12, Sep. 2007.
[12] R. D. Brown, “Reconstructing corrupt DEFLATEd files,” Digit. Investig., vol. 8, pp. S125–S131, Aug. 2011.
[13] X. Zha and S. Sahni, “Fast in-Place File Carving for Digital Forensics,” Forensics Telecommun. Information, Multimed., pp. 141–158, 2011.
[14] Y. Guo and J. Slay, “Chapter 21 DATA RECOVERY FUNCTION TESTING,” Ifip Int. Fed. Inf. Process., pp. 297–311, 2010.
[15] H. T. Sencar and N. Memon, “Identification and recovery of JPEG files with missing fragments,” Digit. Investig., vol. 6, pp. S88–S98, Sep. 2009.
[16] D. Park, S. Park, J. Lee, and S. No, “A File Carving Algorithm for Digital Forensics,” Order A J. Theory Ordered Sets Its Appl., pp. 615–626, 2009.
[17] G. R. Iii, V. Roussev, and L. Marziale, “Chapter 15 IN-PLACE FILE CARVING,” .
[18] L. Marziale, G. G, R. III, and V. Roussev, “Massive threading: Using GPUs to increase the performance of digital forensics tools,” Digit. Investig., 2007.
[19] S. L. Garfinkel, “Forensic feature extraction and cross-drive analysis,” Digit. Investig., vol. 3, no. SUPPL., pp. 71–81, 2006.
[20] R. Poisel and S. Tjoa, “Roadmap to approaches for carving of fragmented multimedia files,” in Proceedings of the 2011 6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, ARES 2011, 2011, pp. 752–757.

About the Authors

Nadeem Alherbawi is a PHD student at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. He received his bachelor degree at Palestine Polytechnic University and his master at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia in computer science and specifically in information security field. His research area focuses on computer forensic and data carving, as well as information security in general.

Prof. Zarina Shukur is a Professor in the School of Computer Science at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. She received her Bachelor degree at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia and PhD at University of Nottingham, and joined as faculty member at UKM since 1995. Her research area is in software testing and verification, as well as application of computing techniques.

Dr. Rossilawati Sulaiman is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Computer Science at the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM). She received her Bachelor degree at UKM. She did her MSc at the University of Essex and her PhD at the University of Canberra. She has been working with UKM since
2000. Her research area is in Cryptography and Multi-agent System.

You can find the full paper and citation references on Medwell Journals.


How Do Criminals Communicate Online?

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Flashpoint, a business intelligence agency specialising in the deep and dark web, recently published a report on the economy of criminal networks online. The report looks not only at where criminals go to communicate on the internet, but also how their communications are structured, and the ways in which online communication has changed the criminal landscape.

Far from the kind of jack-of-all-trades portrayed in TV dramas, today’s cybercriminals structure their operations much like a business, each person having their own specialisms and reporting to the people above them. This helps to ensure that every member of the network takes on tasks that don’t overwhelm them, and often also ensures that the level of communication is kept to a minimum. Each party is only in contact with the level directly above, thus decreasing the likelihood of breaking up the entire network if a single individual’s identity is uncovered by law enforcement.

(c) Flashpoint 2017

Naturally, cybercriminals meet and communicate online, but this is not without its risks. In general, the preferred method of communication is through web forums or message boards, which allow members to talk to one another and also access previous conversations between other members, so that the site gradually becomes a resource for the criminal community.

Of course, this is a risky business, and law enforcement agents are constantly on the lookout for ways to take these forums down. For this reason, the message boards tend to move frequently, experience sudden unscheduled down times, and are precarious places to store data.

It can be challenging to find the ‘right’ communications platform for a criminal enterprise – such things as language, ease of use, and of course anonymity, must be taken into account. When Flashpoint’s researchers looked at the data, they discovered that the top places where information was being shared were ICQ, Skype, Jabber, AIM, Telegram, WeChat, QQ, WhatsApp, and Kik.

The findings differed by country – full details can be found in Flashpoint’s report, a link to which is provided at the end of this article. There were, however, some points that were relevant across all territories.

While forums are hugely popular in the cybercriminal realm, nowadays they tend to be used more as meeting places than as spaces in which to conduct business. Criminal A might meet Criminal B on Forum C, and the two might get to know each other’s preferences and abilities, but any communications regarding actual crimes will generally be held somewhere away from the original forum in which they met. The main reason for this is mistrust of forum administration – as accounts of police taking over and running criminal networking forums become increasingly popular in the news, criminals are in turn becoming more careful about whom they speak to and where they choose to hold their conversations.

Moving conversations to popular services such as Skype and WhatsApp, however, presents less risk to those who want to ensure covert communications due to a sense that their conversations are not being read and monitored by an anonymous administrator who may have ties to law enforcement. Of course these services are not foolproof either, and it is possible for criminal activity to be uncovered here, but where private messaging apps are involved, evidence from these communications tends to be uncovered after the fact, i.e. when a criminal’s device has been seized.

Of all the instant messaging services used, Skype was by far the most popular across the board. The global trendsetters seem to be the Russians, who are known in criminal networks for their technological prowess and so tend to lead the way in terms of deciding which platforms are going to be increasingly popular.

When deciding on a means of communication, criminals have many of the same criteria as the average person. It is important for the service to be easy to use, ideally with as few bugs as possible and a good balance between security and usability. While the popular TV trope of a cybercriminal navigating a complex web of code every time they want to communicate with their criminal buddies is well-known, it has little basis in fact. Criminals, just like the rest of us, want to conduct their business as quickly and easily as possible, without compromising too much on security.

The popular image of a cybercriminal is largely unrealistic

Having said that, security and anonymity naturally remain of high importance in criminal communications. Depending on the level of technical knowledge and sophistication of the persons involved, such questions as whether end-to-end encryption is used; in which jurisdiction servers are located; whether users can verify contacts’ identities; and whether the code is open to independent review are popular concerns. Alongside these lie more basic questions such as the service’s privacy policies and how much information is collected from users when they sign up.

But it’s not just criminals who worry about things like this. Increasingly, members of the public are becoming aware of the privacy options they have and how to exercise them, particularly since Snowden’s NSA revelations in 2013. This makes it harder to distinguish between users who want to keep their communications private for the purposes of hiding criminal activity, and those members of the public who are simply not fond of the idea that their every move might be being watched.

The overall findings of Flashpoint’s research seem to support this. In terms of how they communicate, criminals aren’t very different from the rest of us. They look for a balance between privacy and convenience; they follow trends and use what their friends and contacts use. Russia seems to be leading the way in criminal communications online, and this is perhaps the only way in which criminals differ from the general population. For example, the use of ICQ as a messaging platform has significantly decreased among the vast majority of users, while it has actually increased in usage among criminals. A study conducted by SimilarWeb in 2016, which showed the most popular chat applications worldwide, didn’t feature ICQ at all.

However, Flashpoint’s study found that this service is still popular in Russia, and is growing in use in criminal networks around the world. In late 2016, Mail.ru, which bought ICQ from AOL six years earlier, started to invest heavily in new features within the app, including photo manipulation and “Live Chats”, aka chat rooms which allow users to interact with other people based on topic or geolocation. The fact that these chat rooms are easy to use and feel relatively anonymous makes them a popular place for criminals to move their communications once they have initiated contact via a forum or other means of introduction.

Simply keeping an eye on which messaging services are popular in Russia and extrapolating criminal communications trends from this doesn’t seem like a useful or easy way forward, however. For now, it is generally more realistic to uncover criminal communications data in the course of a given investigation, rather than preempting it, in the vast majority of cases. It is also worth remembering, like the results of Flashpoint’s study showed, that criminals are much like the rest of us in their expectations and requirements: they are looking for technological solutions that are easy to use while also being as secure as possible.

Download Flashpoint’s full report here (PDF)


Enfuse 2017 – Las Vegas 22-25 May

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From the 22nd to the 25th of May 2017, Forensic Focus will be attending Enfuse (formerly known as CEIC) in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA. If there are any topics you’d particularly like us to cover, or any speakers you think we should interview, please let us know in the comments.

Below is an overview of the speakers and subjects that will be featured at Enfuse.

There are several tracks running throughout the conference, including Cybersecurity, Incident Response, Data Governance, eDiscovery, and Basic & Advanced tracks in Conducting Digital Forensic Investigations.

Monday May 22nd

The conference will begin with two sessions for first-time attendees, led by Daniel Smith from Guidance Software. There will then be a welcome reception in the evening.

Tuesday May 23rd

The day will begin at 8:00am, with opening sessions running across all the tracks. Matt McFadden from Guidance will discuss the importance of investigative skill in digital forensic investigations, including a look at how EnCase Forensic 8 can help with raw keyword searching, timeline analysis, bookmarking and more.

Jonathan Rajewski of Champlain College will talk about Internet of Things forensics, with examples from civil and criminal cases.

Ransomware has been in the news a lot lately, and at Enfuse Nick Hyatt from Optiv will give an overview of ransomware for people who are not engineers, stressing the importance of being able to understand what ransomware is and what it does, as well as take-aways that will help your less technical colleagues.

At 9:15 Patrick Dennis, CEO of Guidance Software, will give the opening keynote, and after that the day will once again split into tracks.

Jarrett Kolthoff from SpearTip will talk about accountability and culpability in digital forensics, particularly in instances where an investigator must report to the board of a company. Gerard Johansen will talk about operational security; and there will be two sessions specifically about EnCase, with Lance Mueller demonstrating how to write EnScripts, and Jeremy LeRoy talking about EnCase security fundamentals.

Matt McCartney from Ernst & Young will discuss how to manage large-scale discovery cases, and Ronen Engler from Cellebrite will give a primer on Android forensics.

There will also be a discussion between Guidance Software and SC Magazine regarding the GDPR and the future of sensitive data – a hot topic in today’s world!

Following a break for lunch, Scott Gibbs from Direct Data Discovery will demonstrate how to deal with degraded data in forensic investigations, while in the cybersecurity and incident response streams there will be talks about cyber attacks in banking and ecommerce, as well as a guide to creating an incident response plan.

Brian Chase from Chase Technology will talk about working with lawyers, and Brian Smith from Cellebrite will show a case study in which data are extracted from severely damaged mobile devices.

William Lederer from kCura will talk attendees through the dos and don’ts of evidence handling in forensic investigations; Stephen Windsor from Maddrix will demonstrate how to respond to targeted attacks; and Amber Schroader of Paraben will talk about connecting smartphones to the IoT, and how these connections can help and hinder investigations.

The intriguingly named ‘How To Eat The Elephant’ will be led by Scott Van Nice and will look at dealing with insider risk. James Habben from Verizon will look at the methodology of USB attacks and how to analyse them.

Doug Kaminski from kCura will show how RelativityOne and EnCase can work together on investigations. And Jessica Bair from Cisco Security will discuss how behavioural analysis can be used to identify new ransomware threats.

Following the afternoon break, Stephen Windsor from Maddrix will discuss how to respond to targeted attacks, while Michael Harrison from NTAC will look at password cracking with commercial and open source tools.

Jason Sachowski from Scotiabank will talk about how digital forensic readiness should be proactive rather than reactive, and how companies can begin to make that change.

For anyone who is looking to take their Certified Forensic Security Responder certifications soon, there are a couple of sessions throughout the day that will help you prepare.

Brian Smith from Cellebrite will run a session about advanced cell phone analysis, following which there will be a happy hour in the expo hall.

Wednesday May 24th

The opening panel discussion on Wednesday will talk about how almost every case in the news these days involves digital forensics to some extent, and how investigators can make digital forensics relevant even when it’s not necessarily at the heart of a case.

There will be various EnCase-specific sessions running on Wednesday morning, including a demonstration of how EITT can be used to perform an initial triage of an infected machine, as well as prep for EnCE and EnCEP.

Cindy Jenkins from the University of Washington will demontrate the dissection of ransomware, while Suzanne Widup from Verizon discusses the findings of the 2017 Data Breach Investigation Report.

Brian Smith will take to the stage again to discuss how to legally gather evidence from the cloud, while Greg Hoglund from Outlier Security will talk about machine reasoning and forensic automation, and a group of researchers will discuss the intersection of forensics and incident response.

The former CIO of the White House will give a keynote at 10.30am, after which there will be a break for lunch.

After lunch, speakers from LIFARS will discuss the first 24 hours after a security breach and what should be done. Julie Lewis from Digital Mountain will talk about digital evidence preservation from social media, and speakers from Guidance will give an overview of how to collect data from the cloud.

Forensic report writing will also be a subject of discussion on Wednesday afternoon, along with a session discussing due diligence concerning privacy and data security. Jake Williams from Rendition Infosec will talk about how to uncover malware in Windows 10, and Kathy Winger will help attendees to her session understand cybersecurity and breaches from the perspective of a business lawyer.

The final sessions of the day will focus on compromised web applications, passwords and encryption, Mac hardware triage, and full case automation. After this will be the SANS DFIR NetWars Tournament, in which an incident simulator will require people to learn new skills in a fun, interactive environment.

Thursday May 25th

The final day of the conference will begin with David Ellis from SecurityMetrics talking about why websites are still vulnerable. Suzanne Widup will demonstrate how to use EnScript to make your life easier; and Rajan Udeshi will demonstrate what’s new in EnCase 8.

Jerald Garner from NCUA will discuss how to report cyber and payments risks to the board; Lee Whitfield from Digital Discovery will demonstrate how timestamps on copied files can foil an investigation; and trainers from Guidance will be available to answer your questions.

The ever-popular ‘Tips and Tricks’ session is back this year, in which the Menz brothers and Kip Loving show some of the latest forensic techniques and how they can be applied to investigations.

The closing session will happen at 9.45 in the ballroom, however there will still be a few more talks following the closing session. These will focus mainly on the use of EnCase in investigations, and there will also be discussions of legal discovery on iPhones; the security threats posed by connection devices; and efficient decryption of electronic evidence.

Forensic Focus will be in attendance throughout the conference, and you can see the full programme and register here. If there are any topics you would particularly like to see covered in-depth, or if there are any speakers you would like to see interviewed, please leave a comment below or email scar@forensicfocus.com with suggestions.


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